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Preface 
This paper has gone through several incarnations over the last three years. 
Parts of it were first presented to Prof. Wolfgang Mommsen's 
Oberseminar at Dilsseldorf University. More recently it has benefitted from 
comments received after presentations to Prof. Stig Forster's War and 
Society seminar at Berne University, the Twelfth Naval History Symposium 
at the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis and the graduate seminar 
at the Historical Institute of the University of Trondheim. I would espe-
cially like to thank Or. Gary Weir of the Naval Historical Center and Prof. 
Gyorgy Peteri at Trondheim for their comments on these occasions. Or. 
Toby Philbin ofthe US National Intelligence Council and Or. Keith Bird, 
President of New Hampshire Technical College were also very encourag-
ing. Prof. Volker Berghahn of Brown University made sOlne useful sugges-
tions in a long telephone conversation. 
Several people have provided particularly valuable and detailed com-
ments on the various written drafts. They are Prof. Per Maurseth, 
Trondheim; Tom Kristiansen at the Norwegian Institute of Defence Stud-
ies; and Prof. Boris Barth, now at Charles University, Prague. 
Finally, I owe a great debt of gratitude to Ass.Prof. Patrick J. Kelly of 
Adelphi University, New York, for the unstinting generosity with which he 
has shared comments and copies of sources over the years. 
R.I-I. 
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Intrmiuctimll 
Naval Strategy in an Industrializing World, 1850-1890. 
The British and French Schools, Professionalization 
and Imperialism 
The origins of modern naval thought can be traced back to the latter third 
of the nineteenth century. There are several reasons for this. The most 
obvious one is the revolution in ti,e technology of naval warfare that began 
around 1840. In the course of a generation warships that were not that 
different from their seventeenth century predecessors became obsolete. By 
1870 the iron-hulled, steel-armoured, steam-driven battleship had appeared 
on the scene as the most complicated machine of the nineteenth century. 
None of the contemporary technological innovations in land warfare could 
be compared with these fundamental changes. The consequences for naval 
thought were profound, first at the tactical level, then, from the mid-I 860s, 
at the strategic. I 
A second reason for the growing interest in naval matters in this period 
was related to the changes in the strategic context brought about by 
industrialization. In 1846 Britain abolished the Corn Laws and inaugurated 
the new era of Free Trade and iaissez/aire capitalism. Twenty years later 
the workshop of the world was far wealthier but no longer capable of 
feeding itself. The problem of protecting the sea lanes that carried com-
merce to and from the British Isles took on a new urgency. 
During the last great era of naval connict at the beginning of the cen-
tury the Royal Navy's command of the sea had protected Britain against 
invasion and enabled it to exert considerable economic pressure on the 
continental states through its blockade. Napoleon's response was the self-
blockading lIcontinental system" which, by shutting British commerce out 
from its most profitable markets, caused serious economic dislocation and 
hardship. Fifty years later policy makers and military men were beginning 
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to recognize that the danger Britain faced if the Royal Navy were to lose 
command ofthe sea, was no longer just invasion and economic hardship, it 
was also starvation and social revolution. Out of their discussions grew the 
British "Blue Water" school of naval thought, which represented an adapta-
tion of centuries of historical experience with naval warfare to the strategic 
realities of industrialization and economic specialization within the new 
capitalist world economy.' 
In France, too, naval strategists were beginning to adjust themselves to 
the new realities of an industrializing world. For twenty years La Royale 
had attempted to gain a technological advantage over its rival across the 
Channel. The resulting naval competition culminated in three intense arms 
races. By 1865, however, it had become obvious that French technological 
brilliance could not offset the productive and financial resources that 
Britain could mobilize behind its first line of defence. As early as 1869, 
Richild Grivel proposed to switch to a strategy of commerce warfare 
against Britain's newly exposed Achilles' heel, whilst continuing to build 
battleships for use against the weaker navies of France's continental 
rivals. 3 
This was to be the strategic stance finally adopted by the French navy 
after thirty years of furious debate.' That discussion was above all caused 
by the efforts of the so-called Jellne ecole to find a way out of the strategic 
dilemma facing France after its crushing defeat by the North German 
Confederation. After 1871 the French navy had to accept not only its 
inferiority with regard to the Royal Navy but also the indisputable budget-
ary priority given to the army in the scheme of national defence. France 
could no longer compete with Britain in building battleships. In any case, 
the men of the Jell11e ecole reasoned, the new tactical certainties of war 
under steam ensured that a weaker battlefleet would have no choice but to 
remain in port and could accomplish nothing during a war. 
The leading advocates ofthe new approach, Admiral Aube and Gabriel 
Charmes, believed that technology provided a way out.' Numerous small, 
swift torpedo boats would threaten the vulnerable battleships of the "tyran 
de la mer", thus forcing his fleet, too, to remain in port while commerce 
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raiders carried on a ruthless campaign of destruction on the high seas. The 
Jelllle ecole did not believe that they could starve Britain into submission, 
but they hoped that soaring maritime insurance rates would create suffi-
cient economic and social turmoil to force Britain out of a war. 
The Jelllle ecole's analysis of the new conditions of naval warfare 
proved to be a surprisingly accurate prediction of the stalemate of 1914-18 
and of the coming pitiless war on commerce - in short of the total war that 
pitted whole societies against each other. Their prescriptions also drew on 
centuries of experience with commerce raiding against the superior sea 
power of the British. At the time of writing, however, their belief in the 
effectiveness of the new technologies was overly optimistic; their com-
merce raiding strategy would only become a viable option with the inven-
tion of the ocean-going submarine thirty years later. In addition, the 
strategic debate became entwined with the power struggles of domestic 
politics and between sectional interests within the service itself, making it 
almost impossible for the Ministry of Marine to pursue a coherent policy. 
A third reason for the renewal of naval thought was the process of 
military professionalization, which was given a great boost by Prussia's 
victories in the wars of unification. In the decades following 1871 armies 
all over the world set up general staffs to systematize war planning, and 
some form of conscription was introduced in most countries, often in the 
teeth of sustained opposition from conservative officer corps. For our 
purposes the Prussian professionalization of military education is most 
interesting. All armies eventually introduced some form of staff college in 
imitation oftbe Kriegsakademie, founded in Berlin in 1810. Navies were 
slower to follow this trend, with the exception of two countries. 
The United States had been inspired by the Prussian model of military 
education long before it had proven itself in battle. It may also have fol-
lowed the early lead of the Imperial German Navy in setting up a similar 
institution for the higher education of naval officers.' In this respect the 
two younger navies differed significantly from those of Britain and France. 
With next to no historical experience of naval warfare, and in a period 
characterized by dramatic technological changes and a general lack of 
DEFENCE SlVOIES 2/199(; 9 
interest in naval matters, teachers in these two navies had to start from 
scratch. They had to develop the concepts needed to analyze naval warfare 
and naturally took the strong theoretical traditions of their military acad-
emies as their point of departure. 
At the same time, the marginal importance of their services in the 
respective schemes of national defence made these discussions highly 
abstract. The temptation to develop theories that enhanced the importance 
of the service to the nation was stronger than in countries where it had a 
demonstrably useful role to play. The lack of historical experience com-
bined with a strong institutional motive to ensure that the early 
professionalization of naval education influenced naval thought more 
strongly in Germany and the USA than in the two well-established sea 
powers. 
The fourth reason for the revival of interest in naval matters towards 
the end of the last century actually has little to do with naval slralegy as 
such. It was a consequence of High Imperialism, the rapid expansion of 
European political control over most of the non-European world from the 
early 1880s onwards. It is a fact of fundamental historical importance that 
the early development of naval strategic thought was caught up in and 
overshadowed by the political instrumentalization of navies in the age of 
imperialism. Navalism (which will be defined below) invented roles for sea 
power which had little to do with its tasks in war, but which were very 
useful in mobilizing taxpayers behind programmes for the construction of 
vast fleets of battleships. 
Again it was to be the navies of the United States and the German 
Empire which proved most receptive to navalisI11. Their abstract approach 
to naval theory and their need to prove their importance to an indifferent 
nation were perfect preconditions for their enthusiastic adoption of an 
imperialist interpretation of sea power. Strategic theory, naval history and 
imperialist ideology were inextricably linked in the unsystematic thought of 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, probably the most influential international publicist 
of the 18905. He developed his theories while teaching at the United States 
Naval War College in the second half of the 18805. When he began to 
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publish them in the early I 890s, they were quickly picked up in Germany. 
More than in any other country, imperialist theories of sea power directly 
influenced the strategic concepts of what will be defined below as the 
German school of naval thought. 
This term does not exist in the many studies of the Imperial German 
Navy, but I believe it was a historical reality and that it can be distinguished 
from both the British and French schools. It had more in common with 
important trends within US naval thought, but it also differed from them in 
one important respect: the peculiar political and institutional structures of 
the German Empire made it possible not only for the glaring 
conctradictions between the «military» and «politica!» interpretations of sea 
power to exist side by side within the navy, but even for the latter to 
become the most important plank of the Kaiserreich's foreign policy from 
the turn of the century. 
The following pages are an attempt to trace the development of German 
naval thought from its Prussian origins in the 1870s to the form that it took 
in the so-called Tirpitz Plan around 1900. The political framework within 
which this development took place has been left out of the narrative.' The 
implementation of the Tirpitz Plan was also the expression of the will to 
world power of the newly-united German nation-state and especially of its 
aspiring middle classes. Here, however, I will consider the navy as a 
profession resentful of the public's indifference and craving recognition in 
its own right, as a bureaucratic corporation seeking to enhance its influ-
ence and command more of the available resources, and as a service 
wanting to step out of the shadow of the best army in the world. It is these 
institutional motives that I believe provide the key to an understanding of 
the chain that links the tirst lectures in naval history given at the Marine-
Akademie in the 1870s with the German Empire's attempt to become a 
world power at the beginning of this century. 
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The Germal1l School of Naval ThmJlght 
The modern German navy was brought into being in 1867 by an article in 
the constitution of the North German Federation. Four years later it be-
came the Imperial German Navy. It and the Reichstag were the only truly 
national institutions of the German Empire. Both had a very short history 
on which to look back. During the revolution of 184819 the Frankfurt 
assembly, which was trying to create a German national state by parlia-
mentary means, also decided to create a fleet to defend the coasts of 
northern Germany in the conflict with Denmark; bourgeois patriotic 
associations collected voluntary contributions to finance it. After the failure 
of the revolution, some of the ships were sold, others formed the nucleus 
of a small Prussian navy, and that, in turn, was eventually absorbed by the 
new federal institution of 1867. 
The German Empire was a continental state. It was forged in three 
wars in which the Prussian General Staff under the elder Moltke won 
quick, decisive victories that served perfectly the purposes of Bismarck's 
diplomacy. The navy played an insignificant role in these stirring events. 
For the following quarter of a century, the most ambitious younger ele-
ments in the officer corps smarted under its apparent irrelevance to the 
nation's destiny. Then (as we shall see below) they adopted an ideology of 
sea power, in the light of which a powerful battlefleet seemed to be the 
necessary spearhead of the Empire's further development into a twentieth 
century world power. 
For tlle first 25 years of its existence tlle navy's tasks were narrowly and 
precisely defined, first by the Prussian war minister Roan in 1865' Moltke himself 
described them in Febmary 1873 as protecting against invasion from tlle sea, 
hampering a close blockade and preventing the bcmbardment of coastal towns'" 
The first head oflhe Admimlty, Stosch, added the use or cmisers to protect 
Gennan merchants overseas; but he was equally clear that the navy could not hope 
to face up to a major European antagonist in home waters.' 
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His successor from 1883 to 1888, Caprivi, was if anything even more deter-
mined to give tile army absolute budgetaJy and strategic priority, [[ After he had left 
tile Admiralty to follow Bismarck as Reich Chancellor, Caprivi did however 
concern himself Witll the problem of securing supplies of foodstuffs to ti,e anny in 
time of war," Gennany's rapid industrialization wo" making it increasingly depend-
ent on imports of food and raw materials from overseas; if they were interfered 
Witll, tllat could at least affect tile anny's staying-power in a protracted war, 
Caprivi saw that tile navy would have a role to play in preventing a close blockade 
of tile coast; but he also recognized that ti,e country's abysmal geographical 
position, with the British Isles obstructing its access to the Atlantic trade routes, 
would make it easy for France to bottle up tile Nortll Sea, Since Gennany could 
not break such a wide blockade, he concluded pessimistically tilat only ti,e superior 
speed of modem merchant steamers would help them escape the blockaders and 
make it to tile sate area ofthe NOrtll Sea that tile navy could manage to control. [J 
TIle basic premise underlying tilese definitions of the navy's tasks remained tile 
same for 25 years: Gennany was a continental state; its fate in a war Witll France 
or Russia, or botll, would be decided on land by tile army, 1l1is did not mean that 
Gennany did not need a navy, but that it needed one to cover tile chinks in its 
armour left by its exposed North Sea coastline and growing dependence on 
overseas trade. TIlere is little to add to the evaluation of this strategic stance that 
TIleodore Ropp made in 1937: 
The German navy was simply another arm of a rational fl)-1Slem of 
nalional d~fense. [ . .} Ihe navy was merely Ihe part of Ihe arm)' Ihal 
happened 10 walch Ihe sea/i"onlier. [ . .} 
Germany's policy of a mobile coast d~rense 011 land and sea, a product 
of the army's dominGtion of strategy, was { . .} but the reasoned policy 
0.1" the mililm:l' masters o.f Europe in accord with the principle of the 
greatest economy a/forces under a unified command. f.I 
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The Development of Tactics 
The strategic framework within which the navy was to develop, was 
securely set, but there was a vast amount of work to be done to develop 
the materiel, know-how and doctrines necessary for it to be able to fulfill 
these tasks. The fleet was being built from scratch at a time when the new 
technology of the industrial revolution was undermining many assumptions 
about how the ships, and what kind of vessels, were to be used. 
The British and French navies had faced the same problems since the 
1850s. Their initial response to the uncertainty caused by the new and 
changing capabilities of steam warships was to fall back on the tried and 
tested maxims ofland warfare. By the end of the I 860s, however, this 
«militarization of naval warfare»!5 receded into the background as the 
weight of historical experience, tempered by contemporary strategic 
analysis, began to reassert itself. During the 1870s, as already mentioned, 
two very different national schools of naval thought began to emerge, the 
B:t:itihBlue Water school and the French Jeulle ecole. 
In Germany, too, tactical doctrines developed through a process of 
methodical experimentation that drew on analogies from land warfare. 16 
Under Stosch, tactical patterns were drawn up on paper and tested in 
evolutions at sea; the results were evaluated, and the conclusions drawn 
eventually took the fonn of formal tactical doctrines. They were to guide 
commanders in the period after the enemy had been sighted but before 
battle was joined." After a period of revision during the 1880s, these 
formal tactics were further developed into what Curt van Maltzahn called 
applied tactics." Caprivi led the way in building a bridge between tactical 
doctrines and manoeuvres, on the one hand, and battle tactics, on the 
other. In 1888, shortly before he stepped down from the Admiralty, he 
circulated his Twelve Tactical Questions within the officer corps. The 
responses summed up much of the experience gained as a result of fifteen 
years of work on the systematic development of tactics. I'! 
The further development of battle tactics owed much to the methodical 
work carried out by the Torpedo Section, which was founded in 1877 and 
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led for twelve years by Korvellenkopitiin Alfred Tirpitz.oo The Torpedo 
Section pioneered a scientific approach towards resolving specific prob-
lems. It would test a theoretical solution in experiments and exercises; this 
process of trial and error resulted in practical applications of doctrine that 
came as closely as possible to reproducing war conditions. By the end of 
the 1880s squadron tactics had begun to emerge as a by-product of the 
work of the so-called to/pedo gong. The evolution of German tactical 
thought had reached a point where it fitted neatly into the concepts of the 
emerging ship-of-the-Iine school. 
A caveat must be entered here. The obsession with the decisive battle 
on the high seas between fleets organized in squadrons of battleships acting 
in accordance with clearly defined and tested tactical doctrine - an obses-
sion that was to grip all major navies during the I 890s - was not the end 
resuit of a long process of practical experimentation or the attempt to solve 
concrete strategic problems. It was derived from a completelY different 
source. 
According to Maltzahn. the concept of the decisive battle on the high 
seas between fleets of battleships owed more to gut feeling or abstract 
speculation than to the practical experience gained by navies during the 
deeades of rapid teChnological change." Herbert Rosinski, who was in an 
unrivalled position to compare German naval thought with that of other 
countries, stated later that the special circumstances of the Imperial Navy's 
early years led it to develop a "peculiar deductive approach" to the study of 
naval warfare. As we shall see below, German theoreticians were not alone 
in adopting certain abstract principles or "laws" drawn from the study of 
land warfare. But their deductive approach did mislead them "into pressing 
naval warfare into a conceptual framework evolved out of the totally 
different conditions obtaining on land, or else into purely abstract discus-
sions and distinctions which gave their work a strange atmosphere of 
unreality. "22 
In Germany, as in the United States, one ofthe most important centres 
from which this abstract strain of thought emanated, was the highest 
educational institution within the naval establishment. In the latter case, this 
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was the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, which opened its 
doors in 1884. In the former, it was the Marine-Akademie, founded twelve 
years earlier. 
The Strategic Axioms of the Prussian School: 
Stenzel and the Marine-Akademie 
In 1872 Stosch decided that the new navy would need an institution for 
advanced studies. It should further the education of the best qualified 
officers in a broad range of fields. Among other subjects, which included 
modern languages, hydrography and international law, they should also be 
taught strategic theory and naval history." The Marine-Akademie (MA) 
was first situated near Kiel and drew on lecturers from the university in 
certain subjects. It later moved to Mlirwik, near Flensburg. From 1875 to 
1883 the course lasted for three years; Caprivi reduced it to two. 
The obvious model for the new institution was the Kriegsakademie in 
Berlin, but it is more interesting here to see it in its international context. It 
is often stated that the US Naval War College was the first institution of its 
kind in the world." In fact, that particular honour belongs to the Marine-
Akademie. (Perhaps it has been confused with the Naval Academy at 
Annapolis because of its similar name. But the equivalent German institu-
tion for the education of naval cadets was the Marineschu!e. The most 
likely explanation for the mistaken claim is that whereas the USNWC has 
been the subject of much scholarly attention, the MA has received hardly 
any)." 
The parallels between the two establishments throw an interesting light 
on the origins of modern naval thought. It is pertinent to speculate as to 
whether they did not exert a stronger influence within their respective naval 
establishments than did the equivalent (and much later) institutions of 
further education in Britain and France. Institutionally, as well as with 
regard to the methods and content of the subjects taught, the Berlin 
Kriegsakademie and the Prussian professionalization of the study of war 
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were obviously the ideal both sought to emulate.'" Both the Imperial 
German and the US Navy were much younger than the Royal Navy and La 
Royale. They did not have centuries of historical experience with naval 
warfare to draw on, and the imponderables of technological change 
probably made them more receptive to the abstract theories taught to the 
young elite of the officer corps. 
Even more importantly, they were both assigned a marginal role in their 
countries' schemes of national defence. The recently re-United States were 
not threatened by anyone, and the German navy lVas a very junior partner 
of the glorious army that had forged the Empire and continued to defend it. 
Neither lVas faced with pressing tasks of vital national import. It seems 
probable that this restricted strategic context provided a certain latitude for 
imaginative theories: any consideration of tasks that went beyond coastal 
warfare or gunboat diplomacy opened up a wide field for abstract specula-
tion. Although documentary evidence is hard to come by, it is also reason-
able to suspect that a strong institutional motive lay behind the adoption of 
theories that served to enhance the importance of the navy to the nation." 
One problem that both institutions of higher education obviously did 
face, was a complete lack of modern studies of the theory of naval war-
fare. "The US Naval Institute Proceedings, the Navy's most learned 
publication, did not run a single article on strategy or tactics tram its 
founding in 1874 until 1886."" Neither did any of the leading military 
periodicals in Germany. The Marine RlIndschall was only founded in 1890 
and shied away from anything remotely connected with politics until the 
High Command gained control ofit in 1894." Before that, the only publica-
tion devoted to naval affairs was the Beih~fie ZlIlIl Marine-
Verordnlll1gsblatt. During the 1870s and 1880s it published less than a 
handful of decidedly uncontroversial, anonymous articles on tactical 
subjects; more importantly, it contains only the most sporadic of refer-
ences to contemporary debates in British and French journals. The more 
widely circulated military periodicals also yield a very poor harvest. The 
Nelle mililarische Blaller contains not a single article on naval matters 
before 1892; the Revue der gesammten Armeen und Flatten did provide the 
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occasional descriptions by naval omcers of life in the mangrove swamps 
of South-East Asia or among Peruvian indians; the Mililtir-ffhchenblall had 
even less to offer. Where was a teacher of naval history and strategy to 
turn? 
In 1887, Captain Mahan described the situation thus: JO 
There is an entire lack olte,-rlbooks upon \vhich to hase a course of 
instruction.[ .. .] There is nothing in the range of nGvallilerature (0 
place alongside the many and elaborate treatises in the art o.flvar on 
land il1 its various branches. All/ch indeed has been written. But what 
has Ihus far been produced is jiJr Ihe mosl part ji-agmentary, repre-
sen/alive of special views, partial and unsystematic in trealment. No 
Gllempl has been made to bring the whole Sll~ieCI under review in an 
ol'der(v well-considered method 
A decade earlier, the first teacher of naval strategy and history at the 
Marille-Akademie, Kapitall zlIr See Alfred Stenzel complained of the same 
dimculty. He could only mention two attempts to master the theory of 
naval warfare, Richild Grivel's La guerre maritime (1869) and Seekrieg 
ulld Seelaklik by the Austrian Attlmayr - and he regarded both as being 
only partially successful. Stenzel was forced to prepare his lectures on the 
theory of naval warfare from scratch, with no similar works to draw on. 
They were not published until seven years after his death in 1906; but 
according to his pupil and editor of his posthumous papers, Kirchhoff, the 
text was substantially finished within a few years of his taking up the 
position in 1875." 
Stenzel taught at the Marille-Akademie until 1881, and then again from 
1894 to 1896 when he resigned in disgust and ill-health." During his first 
stint as lecturer his pupils included several officers who, as Admirals, were 
to lead the Imperial Navy in the decades before the First World War." How 
then is his influence to be measured? Kirchhoff described him as the 
"German Mahan". Borckenhagen, who translated The lIif/uellce of Sea 
Power 011 Hislmy into German, also compared Stenzel favourably to 
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Mahan; he recalled, in 1896, how stimulating his lectures had been and 
thought it a shame that none of his successors had had the same stature or 
been able to build on the foundations he had laid. Even in 1929, in Otto 
Groos's apologia for Germany's pre-war naval strategy, Stenzel got a 
favourable mention as the founder of a German science of naval warfare. 
In his memoirs, Tirpitz stated that naval history was taught ltinsufficicntlyll 
when he was a pupil at the academy, but that did not mean that he did not 
learn anything from it." 
Instead of making claims about Stenzel's influence that would be 
difficult to prove One way or the other, it is sufficient to state that he was 
the most pronounced representative of tendencies within early German 
naval thought which can also be substantiated by other references. These 
tendencies can be summed up as the transfer of the central tenets of 
German military thought to the theory of naval warfare. More specifically, 
the influence ofClausewitz is present throughout Stenzel's work, and 
especially in his theoretical writings: they are full of unacknowledged 
quotations from On War, some of them slightly altered, most of them 
verbatim. Indeed, Stenzel originally wanted to publish his lectures under the 
title On War at Sea ("Yam Seekriege"). His borrowing of innumerable 
quotations from On War, and even more of a specific approach to the 
subject, are so obvious that Kriegfiihrung zur See can best be described as 
one long attempt to baptize Clausewitz with salt water. 
Clausewitz did not become famous for his penetrating analysis of naval 
warfare. In fac~ he was completely ignorant of the subject and had not a 
word to say about sea power in any of his writings. Whether or not his 
maxims can be adapted to suit the conditions of naval warfare has been 
discussed. lulian Corbett certainly found inspiration for his great study of 
the subject in a surprisingly sophisticated and modern reading of On War. 
Since 1945, the differentiated approach to Clausewitz founded by Hans 
DelbrUck, Corbett and Rosinski was further developed by lehuda Wallach 
and Peter Paret and culminated in Raymond Aron's magisterial study." 
Their work revised the interpretation ofClausewitz as the prophet of the 
decisive battle of annihilation. They drew heavily on the plans for a revision 
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of the manuscript of all War that Clausewitz outlined shortly before his 
death in 1831. This research has made it clear that had he lived longer. he 
probably would have toned down his previous insistence on the destruction 
of the enemy's main force in battle being the sole objective in war. 
However, Azar Gat has recently subjected this interpretation of 
Clausewitz lo withering criticism. He claims that Aron, Bernard Brodie and 
other defellse illtellectuals have created a distorted image of the philoso-
pher of war that suited the needs of strategists in the age of Mutual As-
sured Destruction, but ignored the real inlluence of Clausewitz on the men 
of the nineteenth century. The crux of Gat's argument is that although 
Clausewitz may have recognized that the military objective in a war need 
not always be the destruction of the enemy's main force, the concept of 
battle was inherent in his very definition of war itself: there may be various 
objective, in war, but for Clausewitz battle is the only mealls; it is the 
activity that defines the very phenomenon of war and isolates it from other 
forms of human interaction.Jf) 
There is no doubt that Gat's interpretation is borne out by a study of 
Clausewitz's influence on German naval thought in general and on Stenzel 
in particular. It is not necessary here to discuss Stenze!'s borrowings, or 
their usefulness for naval theory, in detail, because one stands out above all 
the rest, and from it all the major consequences flow. In Book I, Chapter 2 
of On War, Clausewitz wrote the following:J7 
20 
171ere is only one [means in wm}: combat [..] it is inherent in the Vel)' 
concept of WOI' that evel),thing that occurs II/ust originally derive/i'olll Call/bat. 
[..} TIw whole a/mm/a1)! activity must therqfore relate directly or iJ1direc/~J! to 
the engagement. 77ze end/or which a soldier is recJ1tifed, GJ1lled, and trained, 
the whole object qlhis sleeping, eating, drinking. and marching is simp/v that 
he should fight at the right place and the right time. [..] Thus it is evidellt that 
des/l1lc/ion qfthe enemyjoJ'ces is always the SUpel'iOl~ more t!;DeClil'e means, 
with 'which others cannot compete. 
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On this subject, Stenzel had the following to say:" 
H'hether direc!lJ' or indjrect~}J: The destruction o(the enemv forces is 
(he fOllndation oral! mililarv aclivilv; in order to bring it about, we 
have only one means, ~,mntJat The end/or which the crew is recruited, 
clothed, trained and led, ji)r which the ships are built, equipped, and 
armcc'/ - is simp(l' 10 tight al (he right time at !he right nlace. 
Stenzel does recognize that there are differences between land and sea 
warfare, the most important being that at sea there is no terrain to present 
obstacles to progress in any direction. Therefore, naval warfare is divided 
into coastal war, where the proximity of land does present certain obsta-
cles, and war on the open seas, where there are none. He concludes that 
though these factors may make naval warfare appeal' very different to war 
on land, they are essential(l' ("ihrem Wesen nach") very similar.l9 But he 
apears to have no clear conception of what battle was supposed to achieve, 
apart from the destruction of the enemy fleet. He seems to regard second-
ary operations such as commerce interdiction and blockade as akin to 
Clausewitz's pursuit after battle: the object is to complete the destruction 
of the enemy's organized resistance. Although he speaks of "commanding 
the sea", it is obvious that the Mahanian concept of command as the object 
of battle is not part of his vocabulary. A comparison with other sources 
makes it highly likely that the concepts of "command" and "sea power" 
entered German naval thought only after the publication of The influence 
a/Sea Power on Histol)' in 1890.40 
One final point to be made is that there is no trace in Stenzel's work of 
an ideology of sea power, such as will be identified with Mahan in the 
sections below. When he addressed the problem of protecting sea interests, 
he thought in terms of the direct protection of German merchantmen by 
cruisers on the high scas. 4 ! Similarly, when Stosch expressed his concern 
for Germany's overseas commercial interests, he wanted more cruisers on 
foreign stations, so as to provide direct protection to German merchants in 
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areas where the rule of law was liable to break down. Even though he was 
in favour of colonial expansion, Stosch, while head of the Admiralty, did 
not share the later belief of German navalists that a bat1letleet in European 
waters would provide the military backbone necessary for overseas 
economic expansion.4:! This is even more true ofCaprivi's plans for a navy 
designed to break a close blockade ofthe German coast." 
To sum up, Stenzel must be regarded as the founder, or at least as the 
most pronounced reresentative, of a Prussian school of naval thought. The 
axioms of this school provided the theoretical framework within which the 
Imperial Navy developed during the first half of its existence. Three 
characteristics distinguished the Prussian school from contemporary 
British and French naval thought, as well as from the German school that 
grew out of it from the mid-I 890s. The first was its speculative nature, 
which can be put down mainly to the marginal role of the navy in the 
scheme of national defence. The second was the transfer of Clausewitzian 
axioms to naval warfare. The third was the fact that the Prussian school 
was not imperialist: where they occur, terms such as "sea power", Hcom_ 
mand of the sea", "the protection of sea interests" and so forth, do not yet 
have the connotations they were to acquire during the course of the J 890s. 
The early professionalization of higher education in the Imperial Navy 
was probably the most important factor contributing to the propagation of 
abstract, axiomatic theories of naval warfare; and their insistence on the 
pivotal role of the decisive battle facilitated the rise of the proponents ofa 
big battlefleet. It is certainly hard to identify any alternative source of such 
doctrines in the late I 880s, whether in foreign influences or in the experi-
mental work carried out at the tactical level. Furthermore, the similarities 
between developments in the German and US navies also led the former to 
embrace Mahan's ideolob'Y of sea power when it became publicly known 
in the first half of the 18905. 
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Mahan the Strategist and the Peculiarities of Naval Warfare 
It is well-known that when Mahan found himself in the same situation as 
Stenzel had been in a decade earlier, he turned to the Swiss military theore-
tician Jomini for inspiration". From him he borrowed "the principle of 
concentration, the strategic value of the central position and interior lines, 
and the close relationship between logistics and combat."·" Due to the 
enormous success of his historical studies and political commentaries, 
Mahan's thought became an international benchmark. He can therefore be 
said to have initiated the scientific study of naval warfare:'" His transfer of 
Jominian concepts may have been irrelevant, inappropriate or downright 
wrong, but by having set a standard, he opened the way to debate, revision 
and greater precision. 
Mahan's most important borrowing from Jomini, however, was the 
transfer of the concept of the decisive, Napoleonic battle of annihilation to 
naval warfare." As he put it himself: "Jomini's dictum that the organized 
forces of the enemy are ever the chief objective, pierced like a two-edged 
sword to the joints and marrow of many specious propositions."48 Mahan 
gave the term "command of the sea ll a specific content and a wide CUf-
rency; but he also linked it inextricably to the concept of the decisive 
engagment on the high seas between fleets of battleships. There waS some 
historical justification for that linkage; but it will be shown in the following 
that Mahan's understanding of the exclusiveness of command had logical 
consequences which did not easily tit his unshakeable belief in the decisive 
battle as the primary means in naval warfare. 
Azar Gat has pointed out that - by historical coincidence - there were 
striking parallels between land and sea warfare in the era ofthe great 
conflict between Britain and Napoleonic France. Specifically, Napoleon and 
Nelson stood as representatives of a new kind of tactics that sought to 
break with the "indecisiveness" of eighteenth-century warfare by seeking a 
decision in battle:l<) Mahan studied the history ufthis last great period of 
naval warfare in detail, and it was a logical step to find in it conclusive 
proof of the "eternal" principles of war he derived from Jomini. He ignored the 
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fact illat such decisive warfare was made possible a century earlier by 
technologies that had since changed beyond all recognition. Above all, after 
the introduction of the ocean-going submarine in 1910, his concept of com-
mand of the sea was being literally undermined by the ability to evade it. 
Yet that concept itself had consequences that were incompatible with 
Mahan's emphasis on the decisive battle. According to Rosinski, Mahan's 
most important insight into the peculiar nature of war at sea was his 
recognition of the exclusiveness of command. Although in historical reality 
command had often been in dispute, Rosinski pointed out that the concepl 
of command and its indivisibility which is to be found in Mahan, must 
serve as the point of departure for a theory of naval strategy."; From it 
Mahan derived the "fundamental principles of all naval war, namely, that 
defence is insured only by offence, and that the one decisive objective of 
the otTensive is the enemy's organized force, his battletleet."" 
Yet this did 1101 necessarily imply that command could only be gained 
through victory in a decisive battle. As Julian Corbett was to point out" 
The al/empl to seek the enemy with a ViC)'l' 10 a decisive action was 
again and again ji'ustrated by his retiring 10 his own coasts, where 
either we could not reach him or his facilities for retreat made a 
decisive result impossible. [...} It is a curiolls paradox, blll if is one that 
seems inherent in [he special/ea/lire (?(nGval H-ur, which permits the 
armed force to be removed }i'om the board altogether. 
Thus, to quote Rosinski again, "the dynamic strategic problem" of naval 
warfare is the "control of the enemy's armedforceslf, and not necessarily 
their destruction. «What we wish to command or to control is not 'the sea', 
but our opponent...[ ... ] 'Command of the Sea' thus in the last resort rests 
upon the power to blockade"." 
From Mahan's insight into the indivisibility of command, we theretore 
arrive at the conclusion that blul.:kade is the primary means in naval war-
fare. It is a means of both exercising and attaining command. Battle, which 
for Clausewitz was the only means and inherent in his definition of war 
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itself, was much rarer at sea, Since the consequences of defeat were so 
much more decisive, the weaker fleet would prefer to retire to harbour and 
to act as a "fleet in being", a permanent threat to the blockader ifhe did not 
maintain the strength of his forces. Battle was a secol1dmJ' means of 
gaining command which would only occur if the weaker side believed it 
had a good chance of victory. 
In the age of sail, accidents of wind and weather blurred this picture, 
providing opportunities for the enemy to evade the control of the blockader 
and to dispute his command. The Royal Navy seldom held absolute com-
mand in its wars with France; and it exercised its control of the enemy 
through smaller vessels - to a much greater extent than Mahan was willing 
to recognize. 54 But the introduction of steam propulsion in the mid-nine-
teenth century did serve for some decades to move the realities of naval 
warfare closer to the concepts of theory. "When steam propulsion finally 
became universal, the advantage formerly going to the weather-gage 
passed to a degree, but to a degree only, to the fleet possessing greater 
speed. [ ... ] A margin of material superiority became a more dependable 
guarantee than formerly of supremacy in the theatre of war. 1155 The weaker 
side would have no illusions about what it could achieve against a stronger 
opponent; hence it would run from battle and submit to the control of the 
stronger. 
Surprisingly perhaps to those who might still consider Mahan the only 
true prophet of naval strategy, conclusions close to those above were 
clearly drawn by the strategists whom he most consistently criticized, the 
French Jelll1e ecole. In 1882, Admiral Theophile Aube surveyed the capa-
bilities of modern navies and envisaged the following consequences of 
steam, armour and torpedos:'" I) Given technological equality, the numeri-
cally stronger fleet was assured of victory. 2) Since the weaker fleet would 
foresee its defeat, battle would have to be forced by the stronger. 3) Since 
the relative strengths of the fleets would be known at the outbreak of 
hostilities, the empire of the sea would pass to the neet with the greatest 
number of armoured battleships. 4) No more battles for the empire of the 
sea would be fought. 5) Maritime war would cease altogether. 
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Aube believed this to be an absurd conclusion. The Jelllle ocole sought 
to avoid it by embracing the opportunities opened up by new technology. 
In their enthusiasm they over-estimated the effectiveness of torpedo boats. 
It was only the invention of the diesel-driven submarine thirty years later 
that made their vision of an all-out war on maritime commerce possible. 
Yet, as both Theodore Ropp and Herve Coutau-Begarie have pointed out, 
their description of the paralysis of the great battlefleets and the coming 
war on commerce was an accurate prophecy of the events of 1914-18." 
These French strategists drew conclusions from their analysis of contem-
porary technological developments that Mahan was unwilling to deduce 
from his own theoretical insight into the exclusiveness of command. 
The Prussian School Meets Strategic Reality: 
The Honing of German Naval Doctrine, 1891-1894 
I-Iow did the Prussian school fare in adapting its strategic axioms to the 
realities of modern naval warfare and to the defence needs of Germany? 
The answer is: fairly well, for a while. 
The central figure in this process was Kapi/all Oil/' See Alfred Tirpitz. 
I-Ie became Chief of Staff at the Baltic squadron in 1891; then, 1Tom 1892 
to 1895, he exerted an enormous influence on the intellectual development 
of the navy in his capacity as Chief of Staff at the I-ligh Command. His two 
most important - and completely distinct - contributions to the emergence 
of the German school of naval thought were the adaptation of its abstract 
concepts to the realities of naval warfare and the adoption of Mahan's 
ideology of sea power. 
During 1891 Tirpitz wrote three memoranda on organizational and 
theoretical topics." The thrust of his arguments can be summed up in one 
sentence: all aspects of the navy's activity had to be directed towards 
preparing it for the strategic offensive that was to culminate in a decisive 
battle. This idea was almost certainly not derived from Mahan; "command 
of the sea" and "sea power" do not yet get a mention. Nor can they be seen 
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as the culmination of his twelve years' work at the Torpedo Section; his 
belief in the central importance of battle on the high seas can be docu-
mented well before 1877. 59 
There are strong grounds for tracing Tirpitz's obsession with battle 
back to the same source as Stenzel's; Clausewitz. A memorandum he 
wrote in September 1877 opens with a statement that he had made six 
years earlier and that he was to repeat in 1891 and 1894:,,0 
It is ehameteristie of bailie on the open sea Ihal ils sole goal is Ihe 
al1nihilatiol1 of Ihe enemy. Land bOllle offers alher laelicalpossibililies. 
such as taking terrain, which do 1101 exist in ·war al sea. Onl), annihila-
tion can be accounted a success al sea. 
Caprivi said the same in 1888. This statement of first principles, to which 
Tirpitz apparently was very much attached, certainly echoes the early 
chapters of On War.6I More revealing is the way in which the memoran-
dum of February 1891 approaches the question of how to use the navy in a 
European war. The matter could be studied from below, starting with the 
individual ship and working upwards through tactics. But Tirpitz prefers to 
treat it tram above, from politics through strategy, starting with the "well-
known thought of Clausewitz, that war is the continuation of politics, an 
approach which will have to embrace our whole treatment of naval strat-
egy." He repeated this in the April memorandum; and both there and in 
Service Memorandum IX three years later, Clausewitz is named as an 
authority and quoted at length, specifically on the need for the concentra-
tion of force. In fact, even after he has read Mahan, Clausewitz is the only 
military authority whom Tirpitz quotes directly. 
Now, there is nothing exceptional about a nineteenth-century German 
officer from a patriotic Prussian family reading and quoting Clausewitz.''' 
Even if Tirpitz had never heard of him before, he would have received a 
full dose of his maxims for two hours each week when he attended 
Stenzel's (compulsory) lectures at the Marine-Akademie. In this respect he 
was a typical representative of the Prussian school of naval thought: 
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whatever intellectual activity there was in the navy during its first twenty 
years drew its inspiration from the Prussian army and Clausewitz and not, 
to any noticeable degree, from foreign sources such as the emerging Blue 
Water school or the Jelllle eeole. 
In Tirpitz's case, it is especially interesting that he stuck to his dog-
matic insistence on the decisive battle between battleships even after twelve 
years of hard work on sea-going torpedo boats. In the memorandum of 
February 1891, he explicitly stated that the navy should gratefully transfer 
as much as at all possible from the essence ("Wesen") of the glorious 
anny; at the same time, it should seek to judge where the peculiarities of 
naval warfare began. The experience ofthe Torpedo Section had shown 
that the systematic treatment of tactical matters over a period of years 
could produce results. Once the question of the navy's use in a European 
war had been determined by working downwards from politics through 
strategy, this well-tried method should be used to develop the necessary 
tactics for the whole navy from the ship upwards. 
This was precisely the manner in which Tirpitz proceeded as Chief of 
Staff at the High Command. Like many of his contemporaries within the 
officer corps, it was axiomatic for Tirpitz that the main task of the navy in 
a European war was to prepare for a decisive battle on the high seas. In 
1891 he is apparently in favour of battle under allY circumstances. This 
insouciant disregard for the consequences of defeat can be explained by 
the widespread belief that the next war would be as brief as the last one. 
Tirpitz had at least as strong an institutional motive as Caprivi had had in 
1884 to make sure that the navy "bought itself into" the nation's history. 
His most important achievement during the following years of manoeuvres 
and evaluation was to defille the cOllditiolls under which the strategic 
offensive should be undertaken. In other words, he specified when it could 
serve a useful military purpose - which suicide for institutional motives did 
not.63 
Tirpitz adapted the abstract dogmas that had not hitherto been con-
nected to the practical aspects of operational planning, and in so doing, he 
came close to an understanding of the peculiarities of naval warfare that 
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were outlined in the section above. If that had been all he did for the 
German school in Service Memorandum IX, it would have been a useful 
and impressive achievement; unfortunately it was not, as will be shown in 
the next section. 
For the purposes of this section, the crucial passage of Service Memo-
randum IX is the following. It takes as its point of departure the axiom that 
in Tirpitz's thought can be traced back to 1871 and which is probably 
derived from Clausewitz:'" 
Land It)w/are seeks primari(v to reach its o~iective through the destruc-
tion of the enemy's force and through the occupation qf enemy ten-j-
IOJ)'. To prevent the latter, the enemy army will generally seek to do 
battle at the outset and thereby risk annihilation. HO'wever, Ihe enemy 
fleet as all object call remove itself completely Fomthe strategic 
offensive, and the mere presence of a fleet in enemy wafers does not by 
any means mean absolute command of the sea. To possess this, /brces 
have to he divided alld spread; but, all the other halld, this should not 
occur as long as the enemy fleet is still present and ready/or battle, or 
in other wOf'd~' as long as it has not been decisively beaten. Only then 
can a situation be brought about near the enemy coast which can be 
considered analagous to the occupation of enemy territOl~v in land 
wwfare. The whole ~[fort ~f the strategic fleet q[fensive must ther~rore 
be directed towards forcing a bailie as SOOIl as possible. 
In the following paragraphs, Tirpitz recognized, as had Aube in 1882 and 
as Julian Corbett was to do several years later, that a numerically weaker 
opponent would probably remain in harbour, waiting for more opportune 
circumstances." This, Tirpitz believed, would force the attacker to use 
some of the means normally applied after command had been won (in 
other words to exercise command) in the hope of drawing the enemy out 
10 do ballle. The peculiar nature of naval warfare did however make it 
possible that he would refuse to do so and would remain in harbour, acting 
on events through the mere fact of his existence (in other words as afleet 
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ill being). For these reasons, the attacker would need a considerable 
numerical superiority over the defender. The greater that superiority, the 
greater the degree of command would be, even if the defender were to 
maintain his fleet intact in harbour. Tirpitz concluded that the experience of 
the age of sail showed that a numerical superiority of at least one third was 
a necessary precondition for the fleet offensive. 
He continued by stating that naval history had shown that squadron 
warfare was the most effective form of fleet offensive and that battle was 
its decisive element. He advanced several rather specious arguments 
against the Jelll1e ecole who had had the temerity to think otherwise. The 
only alternative to the struggle for command was inactivity, the passive 
waiting for the enemy that Tirpitz described as morally selj:destructive. In 
the light of later events, it is important to note that in 1894 he unequivocally 
condemns the strategic defensive, indeed he does not seem to believe that 
there even exists such a mode of naval warfare. tit; 
The importance of Service Memorandum IX can hardly be overrated. It 
created the theoretical framework within which naval officers thought for 
the next twenty years." It is especially interesting to note that in defining 
the necessary preconditions for the strategic offensive, Tirpitz had taken 
note of certain peculiarities of naval warfare that were also observed by the 
Jelllle ecole, Corbett - and were at least potentially deductible from 
Mahan's more random utterances. The great advantage of his definition of 
the necessary numerical superiority was that a definite picture of Ger-
many's naval needs could be drawn up on the basis of it. An appendix to 
the memorandum proposed a two-squadron battlefleet of 17 ships of the 
line, flanked by six flotillas of torpedo boats, six large and twelve small 
cruisers. 
1894 was the year in which the military convention between France and 
Russia was turned into a fully-fledged alliance. Faced with the prospect of 
a two-front war, the task of the navy was fairly easy to define: it was to 
prevent the allied navies from gaining a crushing superiority by combining 
the strengths of the Russian Baltic and French Northern fleets. Given 
Tirpitz's definition of the necessary numerical superiority, it followed that 
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the German fleet must be one third stronger than the largest of these two 
fleets. France and Russia had sharply increased their naval expenditure in 
their rivalry with Britain. If the German navy was to be able to fulfil I the 
tasks assigned to it in the scheme of national defence outlined by Moltke, 
Stosch and Caprivi, it had to follow suit." 
There was therefore considerable justification behind the pleas of the 
High Command to the Imperial Navy Office. They asked for an accelerated 
construction programme in accordance with the demands of Service 
Memorandum IX, concentrating on battleships for use in European waters. 
On 14 February 1895 Tirpitz sent two memoranda to Hollmann, State 
Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office. One of them is exclusively con-
cerned with the strategic situation in a war with France and/or Russia and 
paints a gloomy picture of what it will be like in a few years time if nothing 
is done to catch up the lead of the potential enemies"' Hollmann ignored this 
appeal, and a few weeks later Tirpitz gave up and asked to be transferred 
to active service. His friends from the "torpedo gang" remained at the High 
Command and continued to press its demands. These culminated in a new 
memorandum in November, in which it asked among other things for the 
construction of 12 battleships and three armoured cruisers.'o 
This lucid document was the fruit of Tirpitz's three years of systematic 
work at the High Command. It took as its point of departure the political 
constellation - the fact that Germany would have to face the allied might of 
France and Russia - and analyzed the navy's needs in the light of the 
operational doctrines of Service Memorandum IX. Although it recognized 
that the Kiel canal now provided a means of concentrating against one 
enemy at a time, it also pointed out that its value would decline once even 
the united German fleet became incapable of facing either of the potential 
enemy fleets. The simple fact of the matter was that France and Russia 
were building faster than Germany; by 1901 the Imperial Navy would be 
hopelessly outnumbered. The consequences for German naval construction 
were easy to draw: 
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Given the present political constellation in Europe, if Ollr planned 
strategic defensive is 10 have the likelihood o/sllccess, the German 
fleet must be larger than the strongest of the two northern/leets (?fOllr 
probable enemies. Since we can1101 prevent the Danish fleet fi-om 
joining one of Ollr adversaries, sllch a superiority must he one of at 
least 30% if ajler a victorious bailIe our/leel is to be able to oppose 
the second enemy with an effective defensive. 
The memorandum also stated that a long-term construction programme 
would be the most rational means of building up to the necessary level of 
strength. 
Tirpitz was asked to comment on these proposals for the benefit of 
Wilhelm and did so in a note 0[3 January 1896.71 Not surprisingly, he 
agreed entirely with the memorandum. But by this time, the reasons he 
gave for the expansion of the fleet were drawn less from the operational 
doctrines of Service Memorandum IX and more from the second element 
he had injected into the German school in that document: his Mahanian 
ideology of sea power. It is to this increasingly irrational aspect of German 
naval thought that we must now turn." 
The German School and Mahan the Imperialist 
Mahan was not just a strategist who adapted Jominian concepts to the 
study of naval warfare. Together with Admiral Phi lip Colomb and John 
Knox Laughton, he was also responsible for the revival of interest in the 
scientific study of naval history. By placing his narrative of events at sea 
within the broader tramework of political developments, he drew attention 
to the workings of a historical force, sea power, which historians had 
hitherto ignored. 
But he was without doubt most influential in his role as propagandist for 
an ideology of imperialist expansion. Mahan's imperialism, social 
darwinism and racism are often disregarded by those who are most 
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interested in his contributions to naval thought and history;" his imperial-
ism is implicitly dismissed as irrelevant when he is described as a "child of 
his times", even though he described himself in 1900 as "[ ... ) the earnest 
advocate of oversea expansion [ ... ]."74 But it was precisely as a child of his 
times that he most influenced his times, by infusing into the imperialism of 
the 1890s a strong current of navalism." 
The reason why we cannot ignore Mahan's imperialism here, is that it 
also affected his strategic concepts, or rather gave them a double meaning. 
The first chapter of The influence of Sea Power On Histm)', with its 
discussion of the elements of sea power, was the most influential piece 
Mahan ever wrote. It is a cleverly disguised navalist tract, permeated with 
his "theory of national prosperity and destiny founded upon a programme 
of mercantilistic imperialism"."lt provided a checklist against which 
navalist agitators everywhere could tick off their own national assets; but it 
was divorced from his historical analysis of the role sea power actually 
played in the wars he was describing.77 
Most importantly, as Rosinski pointed out, "Mahan fell into the fatal 
error of appearing to make [ ... ) [the) peaceful utilisation [of the sea) 
dependent upon its military control, and of paralleling 'control of the sea by 
maritime commerce' with 'control of the sea by naval supremacy.' [ ... 
Mahan) was induced to make the conquest and retention of oversea 
markets dependent not so much upon the economic ability oftlle individual 
merchant as upon the power of his state to open and retain his markets for 
him by force.'t78 His claim that economic expansion overseas must be 
protected by the military force of the state, made up the most powerful 
argument in the navalist armoury: the state must possess a fleet "commen-
surate with the size" of its merchant navy, its colonial trade, its ttsea 
interests l1 , or whatever.79 
"Command of the sea" is a military concept that is only relevant to the 
study of war because it implies the exclusion of the enemy from the use of 
the sea by force. Mahan extended its use into the study of peacetime 
international relations.'o Similarly, his use of the term "sea power" implies 
that navies exert a force in peacetime which benefits the growth of over-
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seas trade; yet this force somehow seems to work independently of the role 
that the fleet would be able to play in a war. In the final analysis, sea power, 
too, can only be detined by measuring the potential ofa specific fleet, perhaps 
enhanced or diminished by its geographical position - relative to the same 
factors affecting the mililGlJ' potential of its enemies. Any other detinition of 
sea power tums it into a magical force which it is impossible to define. 
This aspect of Mahan's thought polluted the German school Irom the mid-
I 890s and for decades to come."' In Germany, perhaps more than anywhere 
else, the rationales that Mahan the propagandist of expansion devised 10 justify 
the need lur a large US Navy, were taken as a description of strategic realities. 
The belief that only sea power could guarantee the economic and political 
future of the Reich supplanted the rational calculation of potential threats and 
military capabilities. Together with the initial influence ofClausewitz on the 
Prussian school, tilis ideology of sea power represented the second major 
influence on the formation of the Gennan school of naval thought. 
Although Tirpitz does not mention Mahan in Service Memorandum IX, it 
contains certain passages which prove conclusively that he has been reading 
his work since he wrote the three memoranda of 1891."' They are concerned 
with providing arguments, both historical and contemporary, to show what 
beneficial effects a navy can have in peacetime. There is no logical connec-
tion between these claims and the analysis of the preconditions tur the 
strategic offensive referred to in the previous section. The latter were con-
cerned with the lIse of the navy in a European war; the new arguments drawn 
from the ideology of sea power claimed that a powerful fleet in European 
waters would also provide the necessary «backbone» for the peacetime 
activities of Germany's world trade and industry, even its high seas fisheries, 
global transportation and colonies. And:"' 
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110110; 1.1'heJ7 a nation has understood Ihal afieel creates economic advan-
tagesfor the iatherland even in peacetime, [ . .} will it possess the neces-
SOl)' understanding for the nature Gnd pwpose of a navy." 
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Tirpitz later gave this interpretation of the magical peacetime effects of a 
battlefleet a name. He called it "the political importance of sea power" and 
distinguished it from "the military importance of sea power". The latter was 
based on the strategic analysis of the needs of the navy in a war with 
designated opponents; it continued to draw on the doctrines developed 
since 1891. The former interpreted the navy as "nothing more than a 
function of our sea interests. "84 
It is not surprising that Tirpitz increasingly stressed the political impor-
tance of sea power at the same time as he began to consider Germany's 
chances in a war with Britain. The doctrine of the strategic offensive 
which he had developed in Service Memorandum IX, provided a perfectly 
clear answer to this problem: the German fleet had no chance in a war 
against the overwhelmingly superior Royal Navy. This was the conclusion 
he drew in a letter to Stosch of 13 February 1896. But instead of giving in 
to despair at the thought of Germany's impotence, he sought solace in the 
alternative interpretation of sea power:85 
Our policy completely lacks the concept of the political importance of 
sea power. Blit if we have any intention of moving 0111 into the world 
and of increasing our economic strength through the sea, we will be 
erecting a completely hollow structure if we do not at the same time 
provide ourselves with a certain measure of naval strength 
What he believed such strength could accomplish, was apparent in his 
analysis of the strategic situation with regard to Britain. Although he had 
just described it as almost hopeless, he was convinced that once Germany 
had acquired "two to 3 modem [battleship] squadrons with the necessary 
cruisers", it would "suddenly" become apparent to the City of London 
(who in reality determined Britain's policies) that this was a state that had 
to be accommodated in all matters. What Tirpitz did not explain, however, 
was precisely how such a tleet would alter the strategic relationship. It 
would presumably still be inferior to the Royal Navy, so from a military 
point of view, in a war not much would have changed. Service Memorall-
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dum IX stated explicitly that an inferior fleet would be condemned to the 
morally self-destructive strategic defensive. Even were the three modern 
squadrons "suddenly" to appear, the Royal Navy would still possess a 
measure of strength which, according to Tirpi/z's own theory, would force 
the German fleet to remain in harbour and submit to the blockader's 
control. In addition, Tirpitz could hardly be unaware of what his distant 
cousin, chancellor Caprivi, had pointed out to the Reichstag in 1893: that a 
western sea power would probably not bother to institute a close blockade 
of the German coast, but instead bottle up the entrances to the North Sea 
in a wide blockade."' 
It is hard to see why "the City" should force the British government to 
be more accommodating, even after German naval strength had been 
increased. The strategic situation would stay the same as long as the latter 
remained in a position of significant numerical inferiority. This discrepancy 
between Tirpitz's Ilpolitical" and "militaryl1 interpretations of sea power can 
be followed down to the Risk Theory in 1900 (see below). Mahan used the 
ideology of sea power to justify the further expansion of the navy; it might 
not be strictly necessary for national defence, but it could serve as an 
instrument of world power. Tirpitz went further than Mahan, however, in 
giving increasing priority to the political importance of sea power over its 
military role - to the extent that he chose to ignore the doctrines that he had 
evolved himself during the first half of the decade. A navy's deterrent 
effect in peacetime was apparently stronger than its uselessness against a 
superior opponent in a war would lead one to believe. 
How can one explain this slide away from determining the national 
defence needs of the navy in the light of precise operational doctrines and 
towards a programme of potentially unlimited expansion based on the 
alleged "politicai» importance of sea power and justified by the battlefleet's 
role as a llfunction of sea interests ll ?87 
The most likely explanation would seem to be the strength of the 
institutional and personal motives driving Tirpitz. Like Mahan, Tirpitz was 
searching for arguments in favour of a stronger navy, but there was more 
at stake for him. If we consider the events of 1895 from the point of view 
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of the High Command, the "torpedo gang" and Tirpitz himself, the sense of 
personal and professional failure must have been overwhelming. The 
Imperial Navy Office had ignored the patently obvious need for naval 
expansion to meet the most basic of operational tasks. Powerful figures 
had intimated to Tirpitz that he had a great future ahead of him; yet 
Hollmann seemed secure in Wilhelm's favour and continued to ask the 
Reichstag for cruisers. Rather than face further humiliation and the repu-
diation of three years' hard work, he decided to return to active service. 
When the opportunity arose to restate his case towards the end of the 
year, Tirpitz cast around for whatever new arguments he could find. For 
the first time, Britain swims into his ken in his comments on the High 
Command's memorandum of November 1895. This is before the Kaiser's 
telegramme to Kruger first raises the spectre of war between the two 
countries." It is the ideology of sea power which suggests the argument 
that a stronger lleet will serve as a political power factor in relations with 
Britain:89 
Even the strongest European sea power [Sees/oat] would be more 
accommodating to'wards liS (f we were capable l?f tll1'owing 2-3 well 
trained squadrons [of battleships) into the political scales and, if 
necessU1]" into the scales qf a COI?flict. rVe would never achieve that 
with overseas cruisers. 
We have already seen how Tirpitz wrestled with the strategic problem of 
fighting the Royal Navy once the Transvaa[ crisis gave matters a more 
serious complexion, and how he consoled himself with the be[iefthat the 
increased po[itical importance of "two to 3 modern squadrons" would 
somehow alter the situation. We shall see below that nothing had really 
changed four years later when the Risk Theory was enunciated in the 
preamble to the second Navy Law of 1900.90 The identification of the need 
for a '1political power factor" against Britain simply served the interest of 
the navy in building as many ships as possible. This undefinable goal would 
always remain far enough ahead to justi fy further expansion. 
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In the same memorandum of 3 January 1896 Tirpitz used another new 
argument that can also be found in a letter to Stosch of 21 December." He 
now claimed that the economic and the political effects of the fleet pro-
gramme would also prove to be a useful countermeasure to the socialist 
movement. In its best-known formulation, this read:'" 
It is my opinion/hat in the coming een/m]' Germany will rapidly 
decline/rom its present position as a Great Pm1'er unless theful'Ihel' 
development of its general sea interests is taken in hand el1ergetica/~v, 
immediately Gnd syslematicanv. Not least because fhe great nelV na-
tional task and the economic gainsflowingfrom it will also 'work as a 
strong palliative against educated and uneducated Social Democrats. 
An impressive interpretative editice has been erected on the foundation of 
Tirpitz's views on the social question9'. But in the context of this article I 
would suggest that this famous quote provides less of an insight into the 
peculiar political, social and structural problems facing Germany than it 
does into Tirpitz's willingness to grasp at any straw that could serve to 
relaunch his faltering career. Just as the ideology of sea power led him to 
identify Britain as a state against which it was necessary to possess a 
certain measure of "political" sea power, it seems likely that he also bor-
rowed this thought from Mahan, 
In August 1895, Freiherr Curt van Maltzahn, Tirpitz's boyhood friend 
from Frankfurt an der Oder, sent him a letter in which he discussed the 
role sea power had la play for the future of Germany,''' Obviously replying 
to a previous query from Tirpitz, he stated that of course he had read 
Mahan's "French revolution and empire" (which goes to show that they 
both regarded the American as an authority in historical matters), In the 
rest of the paragraph Maltzahn is at pains to demonstrate that he shares 
Tirpitz's interpretation of the relationship between the navy and Germany's 
sea interests. He finishes it with the following sentences: 
38 
Germany 's/illure as a world power depends upol1lhese peacetime 
activilies of our navy. The fleet is called upon [0 play an important role 
in solving the social question It alone can open the roads/i)r the 
./i"lIi!fiti expansion of [he jbrces qf ollr people and preven[ Germany 
fi'om either choking on its excess population or hleeding to death 
through useless el11igration. 
This argument was common enough among nationalists at the time. Max 
Weber, for example, used it in a newspaper article in December 1897, 
explaining why he supported the First Navy Law. In a speech he gave at 
Mannheim on 13 December he prophesied that the time was rapidly 
approaching when power. naked power alone, would decide what share of 
the world's markets a country could exploit for its own benefit. Germa-
ny's workers would then have to make their living exclusively within the 
area that the capital and the military might of their fatherland could provide 
for them:" Maltzahn gave the thought its navalist formulation: it was the 
role of the fleet to provide the necessary backbone for the economic 
expansion that would provide Germany's rapidly growing population with 
jobs and prosperity. The similarities with Mahan's interpretation oflhe 
peacetime role of sea power are obviolls. 
But Mahan had also commented on the domestic political benefits that 
wnuld flow from the increasing rivalry between the great powers. In the 
November 1894 edition of the Nor[h American Review he published an 
article on IIPossibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion n .<l6 Here, with his 
usual verbosity, Mahan saw the most important consequence of the United 
States becoming a naval power - not in a pledge of peace or international 
cooperation: 
Rather in the competition o/interests, in that reviving sense a/nation-
ality, which is the true antidote to lvhat is had in socialism, in the 
Jealous de[el7llina[ion oj"each people [0 provide .firs[ jilr ils own, of 
which [he fide ,!jjJro[ec[ion rising throughout [he world, whether 
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economically an error or not, is so marked a !o,Jmlptom - in these jarring 
soullds which betoken that there is no immediate danger of the leading 
peoples turning their swords into ploughshares - are to be heard the 
assurance that decay has not tOllchedyet the majesticfabric erected by 
so many centuries of courageous bauling. 
It is not unlikely that Tirpitz kept himself informed of the highly topical 
political commentary that flowed from the pen of the historian who per-
haps influenced him even more than Treitschke had. And certainly the 
similarities between the medicinal metaphors ("antidotes" and "palliatives" 
being used against the socialist movement, not towards solving the social 
problem) are so similar as to be hardly coincidenta!." There is certainly a 
case to be made for the interpretation that Tirpitz, as he did when he 
identified the need for sea power against Britain in the same memorandum 
of 3 January, was using whatever arguments he could come up with to 
amplify his demands, tilting the balance away from the military need for a 
two-squadron battlefleet and towards the undefinable "political importance 
of sea power." 
From now on it becomes impossible to disentangle Tirpitz's personal 
and institutional motives from the ideology of sea power. It is pointless to 
ask whether he really believed that the navy was a "function of sea inter-
ests", that a «risk fleet» would provide a necessary "political power factor" 
against Britain or that the new national task would be a "palliative against 
educated and uneducated Social Democrats". For the rest of his life 
nothing served his interests better than to believe it really was so, and to 
convince others that he was right. His well-founded pleas for the construc-
tion of a battlefleet that would serve the needs of national defence had got 
him nowhere. These new arguments, put forward just as public opinion 
began clamouring for a more assertive Weltpo/itik, served to re launch his 
career in 1897, making him one of the most powerful men in Germany for 
the next two decades, and allowing him to mobilize vast sums of money to 
build the world's second largest fleet. Success such as this would have 
made even the most sceptical of men turn a blind eye to the inconsistencies 
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behind the idea ofa "risk fleet" directed against Britain. When it failed both 
to deter Britain from entering the war and to break the Royal Navy's 
hunger blockade, Tirpitz did all he could to lay the blame elsewhere and to 
convince the world that he had been right all along. 
• * • 
At the theoretical level, the German school found its leading exponent in 
Curt van Maltzahn. He had attended the three courses at the Marine-
Akademie between 1879 and 1882 and was described by Kirchhoff as one 
of Stenzel 's leading pupils, who carried on where he had left off. Maltzahn 
taught at the MA from 1895 to 1900, when he became its director. It has 
been stated that he differed significantly from Tirpitz in strategic matters 
and that he was a partisan of the Jellne ecole." In fact, he was just as 
Mahanian as his old friend. He believed equally strongly in the ideology of 
sea power and in the necessity of eventually creating a battlefleet against 
England." He did, however, want to proceed in a different manner, by first 
creating a fleet of overseas cruisers to speed up the growth of Germany's 
f[sea interests It. 100 As those interests increased, the battletleet in home 
waters would grow "commensurately" until it was strong enough even to 
face up to the Royal Navy. 
(It is fascinating to speculate on whether history might not have fol-
lowed a different course had Maltzahn's project been presented to Wilhelm 
in 1897 instead of Tirpitz's. It shows that the Tirpitz Plan was not the only 
necessary outcome of Mahan 's influence on German navalism, and it says 
something about the importance of individuals in history. If Germany had 
spent ten years pouring money into cruisers, Wilhelm would have been 
happy, the nationalists in the Reichstag content - for a while - and the open 
rivalry with Britain would have taken longer to develop. With the benefit of 
hindsight, however, it seems likely that the growth of extra-parliamentary 
radical nationalism eventually would have pushed a Maltzahn Plan in the 
direction it wanted to go anyway). lOt 
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At the Marine-Akademie, Maltzahn's lectures on naval strategy drew 
on two sources, Clausewitz and Mahan. \0, From them he derived his most 
important lesson, that in naval warfare only the clash of battlefleets is 
decisive. To the weaker side, he recommended the "defensive battle", in 
which, although beaten himself, he destroyed so much of the enemy that 
he would have to withdraw from the war, if only out of fear of neutral 
powers. Maltzahn's study of the "defensive battle" was his attempt to 
resolve the same contradictions that Tirpitz faced, in etfect providing the 
"risk fleet" with a tactical theory.'OJ It founders on the same rock as the 
Risk Theory itself, the doctrines of Service Memorandum IX,'D< and it is 
not necessary to consider it in detail here. 
More important for our purposes and for the further development of the 
German school of naval thought, was that Maltzahn transformed himself 
from a Mahanian imperialist into a disciple of Fried rich Ratzel's "political 
geography".,o5 That was not such a big step to take, but it did ensure that 
German naval thought now could travel freely to the wilder shores of 
expansionist ideologies. Henceforth, there would be literally no /ill/it to 
what the German school believed navies could, and therefore should, 
accomplish. Its first major attempt to swim round the world came with the 
implementation of the Tirpitz Plan towards the end of the century. 
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The Tiwpillz !Pian 
With the accession to the throne of Wilhelm 11 in 1888, the navy had 
acquired an enthusiastic and powerful advocate at the very highest level. 
From then on, the question was not whether the fleet would grow in size, 
but what form the increase would take. This turn of events was part of an 
international trend. Britain opened the door on the era of the (<new 
navalism» by sharply increasing the Admiralty's budget in 1889 and 1893. 
Mahan's writings were of decisive importance in turning the imperialism of 
the age towards the sea; the publication of The Influence of Sea Power 011 
History in 1890 provided navalists everywhere with an arsenal of argu-
ments in favour of big battlefleets. 
The peculiar aspect of the situation in Germany was the key role of the 
emperor in the political system designed by Bismarck. This, however, did 
not mean that the adoption after 1897 of the Tirpitz Plan - the long-term 
construction ofa battlefleet directed against Britain'o(' - was inevitable. It 
resulted from the conjunction of two political forces that did not subscribe 
to any particular strategic concept (other than that Germany should have a 
big navy that could rival Britain's), with the ideology of sea power that was 
grafted on to the German school of naval thought. 
Wilhelm's "personal rule" was the first of these necessary precondi-
tions. He himself was certainly inspired by Mahan, but he did not develop a 
systematic understanding of strategy. He simply wanted more ships.,o7 
Whether they were cruisers or battleships was of secondary importance; 
and he would place his considerable political weight behind the man who 
could cajole the Reichstag into giving him what he wanted. His most 
important intervention in the course of events was to choose Tirpitz for the 
job as State Secretary of the Imperial Navy Office and to provide him with 
the latitude he needed to carry out his plan. lOB 
The second political precondition was the will to overseas expansion 
and increasing anglophobia of the German bourgeoisie, its intellectual elite 
and its representatives in the Reichstag. If they had been against imperial-
ism and navalism, there would have been no neet, whatever the emperor or 
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his ministers said. loo A majority of the Reichstag liberally supported the 
battlefleet against England for fifteen years; but they would equally will-
ingly have voted for a differently structured fleet if the competent authori-
ties had told them that a strong contingent of cruisers was necessary to 
defend Germany's overseas interests against British encroachments. 
The Kaiser, chancellor BliIow and broad sectors oflhc population all 
shared Tirpitz's political objective of forcing the British empire to recog-
nize Germany's equality as a world power. But it is highly unlikely that 
they understood the strategic calculations behind the "navy against Eng-
land". They certainly never grasped the long-term nature of the plan or the 
diplomatiC restraint it required."° In the final analysis, the question of the 
rationality or otherwise of the Tirpitz Plan - its chances of success or 
failure - rests on the strategic assumptions underlying it. Therefore, the 
ideology of sea power was the third necessary precondition for the course 
of naval expansion that Germany entered on at the turn of the century. 11 I 
Since the Second World War, most historians have concentrated on 
analyzing the political assumptions of the Tirpitz Plan. In the following 
pages, I shall attempt to show that the political objectives of the plan rested 
on strategic foundations which, in the light of Tirpitz 's own theory, were 
irrational. The very adoption of Tirpitz's concept of a "fleet against Eng-
land" was an irrational act; no amount of politcal acumen could have 
improved its chances of success. An analysis of its strategic foundation 
carried out within the conceptllal/i'amework of the German school itse!!' is 
sufficient to show that the search for the irrationality of the Tirpitz Plan 
begins and ends at its military base. 
The Risk Theory and the "Political Importance of Sea Power" 
In the years between the Kruger telegramme of 1896 and the passage of 
the second Navy Law in 1900 the only development in German naval 
thought was that the "political importance of sea power" supplanted its 
"military" interpretation. The defining moment in this process was the 
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interview Tirpitz had with Wilhelm 11 on 15 June 1897. 112 He had suc-
ceeded I-lollmann as State Secretary a few months earlier. On his return 
from East Asia he found that the naval leadership at Wilhelm's behest had 
worked out a construction programme very similar to the one the High 
Command had presented in its memorandum of28 November 1895.[13 
The great difference between these proposals and Tirpitz's lay in the 
opponent against which the construction programme was to be directed, 
and the reasoning behind it. On 9 April 1897, Wilhelm had decreed that the 
naval authorities were to cooperate in drawing up a construction pro-
gramme for a fleet that was to be half the size of the combined Franco-
Russian fleet. Although the yardstick was slightly different, such a pro-
posal was still in accordance with the ideal of constructing a fleet capable 
of acting according to the operational doctrines of Service Memorandum 
IX.: "That is to say, it must be capable of maintaining an unconditional 
superiority over the Russian Baltic fleet and of successfully challenging the 
French 'Northero or Channel fleet' when sent into action in the North 
Sea.'t! 14 
Tirpitz, on the other hand, proposed to Wilhelm on 15 June that the 
basis of the construction plan should be the "strengthening of our political 
power and importance against England:" [15 
Since any effective form of transoceanic or cruiser warfare against 
England is completely I'lIled out by our lack of overseas bases and 
because ofGermany's geographical position- and as English naval 
officers, the Admiralty etc. are fillly aware of this - all depends, /i'01ll 
the political DOint of view as well. on the bailie fleet between Helgoland 
and the Thames. 
In the memorandum he wrote in July, It, he returned to the dual aspect 
of the problem. It was by basing the construction programme on the worst 
case - a war with Britain - that une cuuld best insure against other possible 
constellations. But in addition: "England is also the opponent against which 
we desperately need a certain measure of sea power as a political power 
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faclOr." The rest of the memorandum concerns itself with showing that 
Germany's military situation with regard to Britain dictates that it station as 
many battleships as possible between Helgoland and the Thames, and that 
such a fleet would also serve its needs in a war with France andlor Russia. 
Yet Tirpitz's treatment of these matters obscured the most important 
consequences of changing both the designated opponent and the reasoning 
behind the buildup. For both these steps would significantly affect the new 
battlefleet's milital)' potential. 
To begin with, when seen exclusively from the perspective of numerical 
fleet ratios, it was correct that measuring the new battlefleet against the Royal 
Navy would also cover Gennany's needs in a war against the Dual Alliance. 
But from a geographical perspective the turn against Britain meant exchanging 
an exceptionally favourable interior line that enhanced the effectiveness ofthe 
German fleet, for an exceptionally unfavourable position with regard to the 
Atlantic trade routes on which both coutries depended; and that would 
diminish significantly its effectiveness in a war against the new opponent. 
Secondly, emphasizing the political importance of "a certain measure of 
sea power" against Britain merely disguised the fact that the proposed fleet 
against France and Russia would be able to act in accordance with the 
operational doctrines of Service Memorandum IX, whereas a !leet inferior to 
the British - by whatever factor - would not. 
lt has already been noted that Reich Chancellor Caprivi had pointed out the 
weakness of Germany's geographical position in a war with a western sea 
power to the Reichstag in 1893. Astoundingly, Tirpitz himself discussed the 
matter in the notes he drafted for the interview with Wilhelm on 15 June 
1897. '17 Lambi's translation and dry comment says all there is to say on this 
subject: 
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[Tilpitz.) 17w operations plan of the High Command bases itself on the 
strategic defensive in the Baltic and the North Seas. One wallls to await 
the enemy and to dejeat him here. The purpose is 10 keep open ollr 
imporls. But 1 believe now that the enemy will not come al once and that 
we will then wait with our large fleet while France lvithout much loss culs 
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"ff /Wo-[hird, [() three-quarters of our imports in [he Channel and North of 
England But this is not my husiness. 
[Lambi's comment] 
This lvas cerlain~l' becoming Tirpi/z 's business, particular£v as the same 
course ofac[ion could be expec[ed./i'om [he British. Tilpilz had thus 
placed Ms finger on the most vulnerahle pninf in his operational planning 
against Bri[ain before World War J and Oil [he jitlili[y of his OWIl program. 
Neither were other authorities on the subject unaware of Germany's geo-
graphical weakness. Ratzel alluded to it in 1900; Mahan pointed it out in 1902; 
and the Chiefofthe Admiralty Staff, Fischel, attempted to draw Wilhelm's 
attention to it in a memorandum of 18 August 1910."" 
The second consequence, the implicit disavowal of Service Memorandum 
IX, has hardly been recognized as such by historians. This is because Tirpitz 
was vel)' successful at concealing it behind a succession of terms which 
ostensibly assigned a definite role to the projected tleet. He never seems to 
have admitted that none of these roles was compatible with the operational 
doctrines he had drawn up in 1894. 
The preamble to the first Navy Law of 1898 stated that "The task of the 
battletleet is coastal defence in home waters. [ ... ] When facing the stronger 
sea powers, the battletleet will merely play the role of a sortie fleet 
[AlIlial!f/ollej"."9 Two years later the fiuTIOUS Risk Theol)' was enunciated in 
the preamble to the second Navy Law, which doubled the size of the pro-
jected battletleet to four squadrons of eight battleships each, plus reserves and 
annoured cruisers:J::!o 
[..} i[ is no[ necessG/)' [hat [he bailie flee[ a[ home is equal [0 [hat of [he 
greatest naval pOlver. In genera/this naval power would not be in a 
position to concentrate its entire naval forces against us. Even {(it 
succeeds in encollntering liS with a superiorforce, the destruction of the 
German/leel would so much damage the enemy Ihat his own position as a 
world power would be brought into question. 
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There is no doubt that Tirpitz wanted to go beyond the first two navy laws, 
although carrying them out was a massive task in itself: He was also con-
strained by what he could get the Reichstag to accept and by the need not to 
cause alanm in Britain about Gennan intentions. His foremost objective was to 
stabilize the rate of construction at a tempo of three capital ships per year for 
as long a period as possible.'" In November 1903 the budgetary department 
of the Imperial Navy Office discussed the various means of reaching this 
goal. One possibility was simply to ask for a third double squadron in addition 
to the two already voted into existence. lOO 11lis would have stabilized the 
l1three tempo" for years ahead and made any further amendments unneces-
sary; given certain preconditions, by 1915 Gennany would have had a fleet 
equal in strength to the Royal Navy in the North Sea. 
But the political consequences of going for the "sea-defence battlefleet" 
(Seewehr-Sdllach!flolle) were daunting. Tirpitz opted instead for a more 
gradual approach. The amendment to the Navy Law (Novelle) of 1906 
stabilized the three tempo for a further six years and gave the Imperial Navy 
Office the financial room for manoeuvre it needed to follow Britain's lead in 
building Dreadnoughts. The Novelle of 1908 reduced the replacement age of 
capital ships from 25 to 20 years, thus increasing the construction tempo to 
four capital ships per year until 1912; after that it would fall to two per year 
until 1917. Tirpitz tried to iron out this wrinkle in the "three tempo" with the 
Novelle of 1912. 
As a result of this succession of amendments, Germany was set to have a 
battlefleet of sixty ships by 1920. Thanks to the twenty-year replacement 
clause and the operations of a stable "three tempo", it would be self-renewing 
and beyond the control of fickle Reichstag majorities. '" 
Is it possible to define the size of the fleet Tirpitz ultimately wanted to 
build? In November 1905, when weighing the pros and cons of a third double 
squadron, he also mentions the possibility of eventually arriving at an "offen-
sive f1eet".'24111e mere proclamation that Genmany intended to build a 
Seewehr-Schlach!flolle of 50-60 ships of the line, would represent so dramatic 
an alteration in the balance of power that he believed Britain would be forced 
to eliminate its rival in a preventive strike. There was therefore no alternative 
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to proceeding step-by-step. The first, insufficient force would gradually 
grow into a purely defensive fleet (blojJe Verteidigllngsjlolle). This could 
eventually be superseded by an "offensive fleet"; but such a change of 
direction could only be contemplated once the defensive fleet was actually 
atloat. "At the present time, it would be irresponsible openly to proclaim 
such an objective." 
Tirpitz did not specify how large an "offensive fleet" would have to be. 
He might have been thinking of the six-squadron navy equal to the Home 
Fleet; perhaps he even contemplated one that could act in accordance with 
the operational doctrines of Service Memorandum IX. If that is the case, 
his ultimate goal would seem to have been a monster fleet of perhaps 
ninety capital ships (if the British did not go beyond sixty); in any case, it 
would have to be one-third stronger than the British Home Fleet for it to be 
capable of carrying the strategic offensive to the enemy's coast. 
It has been pointed out that a fleet larger than the British would have 
given the Tirpitz Plan the ultimate rationality that the Risk Theory lacked. 
But whatever Tirpitz's distant goal may have been, there are numerous 
sources to suggest that he actually did believe in the concept ofthe risk 
fleet, however he might define the necessary ratio between it and the 
British fleet in the North Sea. Or, more precisely, he did believe that a 
weaker fleet could achieve something, and that therefore the danger of a 
British attack was diminishing as Germany increased the risk. 
In 1911, when discussion in the Imperial Navy Office centred on the 
possibility of passing a Novelle to re-establish the "three tempo", one of the 
new phrases being bandied about was the "prospect of a real defensive 
chance" (aussichtsreiclze Defensivchance). Tirpitz now claimed that a ratio 
ofthree British capital ships to two German would guarantee a "good 
defensive chance."'" Earlier he had been holding out for a political agree-
ment with Britain based on a ratio of four to three. 
Let us first consider the chances of a "risk fleet" from a strategic point 
of view. As it was originally conceived at the turn of the century, the Risk 
Theory was based on the notion that a "two-thirds fleet" of 60 capital ships 
would represent a sufficient measure of sea power to give Britain pause 
DEFENCE STUDIES 211996 49 
and deter it from attacking for fear that it would lose its command of the 
sea. Yolker Berghahn has illustrated the rationale behind the calculations of 
the Risk Theory by extrapolating from Service Memorandum IX"": 
Instead (~l\vritiJ1g that a minimum superiority of 33% was necessGlY jiJr 
the sllccesJ:(ul prosecution of an offensive war, it was also possible 10 
reverse the postulate by claiming that the chances o/slIccess in a 
defensive war began with an inferiority of 33%. rFUIl the "two to 
Ihreelf{ormula, therefore, Tirpitz's calculations were moving along a 
knife '.'1 edge upon which - given the supposition that Britain was /he 
attacker and Germany the defender - there existed a theoretical equality 
,,{strength. 1{ the State Secretmy were to succeed in tying the British 
down 10 such a formula, there existed the possibility of slowly and 
CjuietZ)' tilting the balance towards the Retch by improving the German 
fleet's chances of vietmy through qualitative improvements. 
In fact, the "knife's edge" was a broad gap, because the two postulates in 
the first sentence are irreconcilable. m A neet of 60 ships is facing a 
numerical superiority of 1/3 when it is opposed by 80 enemy ships. That 
same fleet of 60 ships is numerically inferior by a factor of 1/3 to a fleet of 
nine(v enemy ships. According to the doctrines of Service Memorandum 
IX, a British fleet of 80 ships would be strong enough to gain command of 
the sea, either by destroying the 60 German ships in battle or - more likely 
- blockading them when they sought refuge in port. This was hardly 
compatible with the second postulate that the weaker fleet would have a 
chance of beating an even larger enemy fleet of 90 ships, when it would be 
facing a superiority of 50%! Neither a German fleet two-thirds the size of 
the British, nor one three-quarters its size could reconcile these two 
postulates with each other. Hence, neither would be a "risk fleet". 
The doctrines of the Risk Theory are incompatible with the doctrines of 
Service Memorandum IX. The recognition in the latter document of the 
helplessness of the weaker side in naval warfare led to the requirement that 
the strategic offensive should only be undertaken with a sufficient numeri-
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cal superiority, and to the denigration of the strategic defensive. The Risk 
Theory was explicitly based on the acceptance of a numerical inferiority 
that according to Tilpitz's own theOl)' implied submitting to the control of 
(he enemy in war. (This conclusion can be drawn from the doctrines of 
1894 alone. It does not take into account Tirpitz's further recognition of 
the fact that a western sea power could exert that control by means of a 
wide blockade of the entrances to the North Sea.) 
Tirpitz claimed at the time, as well as in his post-war propaganda 
campaign, that the German navy could reduce the effects of British superi-
ority by gaining an edge in technology and tactics. Besides, there were 
many historical instances of weaker tleets beating stronger ones in battle.!'" 
Several historians have since followed him in emphasizing this aspect of his 
plans. In fact, as Assmann pointed out in 1939, there were very few such 
instances of a weaker tleet defeating a stronger, and when they had 
occurred, they were mostly due to grave errors on the part of the cOm-
mander ofthe stronger tleet. It was mere wishful thinking to believe that a 
significant margin of technological or tactical superiority could be gained 
over the world's largest and most experienced navy.'" 
So perhaps Tirpitz really was aiming all along at building a navy equal or 
superior to Britain's, i.e. one that would be in accordance with the doc-
trines of Service Memorandum IX. This solution would finally give the 
Tirpitz Plan a sense of strategic rationality. The problem is that what was 
strategically rational was so Obviously politically irrational.'JO It seems 
hardly credible that Tirpitz was so na"ive as to believe that Britain would 
watch idly as Germany gradually built up the world's largest concentration 
of naval power on its doorstep - no matter how softly German diplomats 
trod during the years ofthe "risk zone". 
On the other hand, what was politically rational, i.e. not posing an open 
challenge to Britain by accepting a tleet that was numerically inferior to the 
Royal Navy, was, as we have seen, strategically irrational. And this can be 
seen, not with the benefit of hindsight, or by claiming that tile Germans 
never understood Mahan's theories, but by showing that the "military" and 
"political" interpretations of sea power that existed within the German 
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school of naval thought, were incompatible with one another. 
No wonder Tirpitz laid such stress on the "political importance of sea 
power" and what it could achieve. On 19 August 1897 he pointed out to 
the kaiser that the Navy Law merely projected a sortie fleet, "not a 
battlefleet that would enable Germany to carry out a world policy."IJ' Two 
years later he visited Wilhelm at the royal hunting lodge in Romintern to 
discuss the prospects for the second Navy Law, which had become a 
possibility somewhat earlier than planned. 'J2 He proposed to double the size 
of the fleet, so that: 
Once the goal has been reached, Your Majesty will possess 011 e./Jective 
force of ~5 ships of the line plus all the necessQ/)' support. Such a 
fJowel:fulforce Ihal only England lvill be superior. But even with regard 
to England, thanks to ollr geographical position [sic}. our conscription 
and mobilization ,\Tstems, torpedo boats, tactical training, planned 
organizational structure and the unffled command of the monarch, 'we 
will without doubl have a good chance. 
Quite apart from "our detinitely not hopeless" situation in a war (a topic 
upon which he did not elaborate), 
England will - for general political reasons, and/i'olll the pragmatic 
pOint of view of the businessman - have lost any inclination (0 attack 
us and will consequently accord YOllr Alajesl)' such a measure of sea 
power [Seegeltllng/that Your Majesty will be enable to cany Ollt a 
great world policy. 
Without such a fleet Germany would face ruin. It must continue down the 
road of industrial and commercial development: to keep its popUlation 
German, to afford to create and maintain a powerful fleet, and because 
further economic growth - as unstoppable as a law of nature - itself 
increased its power. The growth of its interests would cause friction with 
other powers, therefore sea power was essential to prevent Germany's 
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decline. Tirpitz envisaged a world dominated by four world powers, 
Russia, England, the United States and Germany. Two of these could only 
be reached by sea, and therefore "the state's power at sea" must spearhead 
this development. 
This was heady stuff, but it also avoided explaining precisely how a 
battlefleet based in the North Sea could influence the future course of 
events. This was to be the tone of al1 of Tirpitz's pronouncements on the 
subject in the years ahead. The strategic presuppositions underlying the 
Risk Theory were never discussed in detail, but time and again the propa-
ganda machine of the Imperial Navy Office emphasized the political 
importance of sea power to Germany's growth to world power. 
* * * 
Tthe extent to which Tirpitz used the ideology of sea power to paper over 
the strategic inconsistencies of his policy, can be illustrated by considering 
some of the explanations historians have given for the ineffectiveness of 
the Risk Theory. 
Wolfgang Wegener's claim that the "cant" of the Risk Theory derived 
from the influence of continental military thought within the German navy 
will be considered in the next section. Here we shall start with the com-
pletely different explanation Eckart Kehr gave for the half-hearted nature of 
the Risk Theory:1J) 
The social crisis/arced the ruling classes to seek foreign policy suc-
cesses, bUI the same social crisis also forced them to avoid the risk (~r a 
war Ihalwould end Iheir dominance if il",ere 10 be losl. rhey had 10 be 
gung-ho and peaceful at the same time. Only when one understands this 
vicious circle is it possible to explain the enthusiasm arollsed by phrases 
like "world policy" Gnd the bloodless vie/my that the "riskfleet " was 
supposed 10 win. 
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This same attitude of the imperialist bourgeoisie also found expression in 
the fleet Tirpitz built: a fleet incapable of taking the offensive against 
England and beating it near its own coast, but that instead waited modestly 
in the Helgoland Bight for the English to attack it According to Kehr, 
Tirpitz's phrase about the great national task being a "palliative against 
educated and uneducated Social Democrats" proved that hc, too, was 
strongly influenced by this motive: "to avoid offensive war for social 
reasons while at the same time enveloping oneself in enormous arma-
ments. " 
Kehr's book is the most influential study of German imperialism ever 
written, His analysis of the domestic political foundations of Wellpolilik 
and the navy laws has been integrated into a sophisticated critique of the 
political and social development of Wilhelmine Germany. The so-called 
"Kehrite" tendency within West-German historiography has a leftist slant 
which is due less to Marxist influences than to the necessary process of 
die Bewdlliglll1g del' Vergal1gel1heil carried out by the first post-war 
generation of historians. 'J4 Although Kehr's interpretations were the major 
inspiration of this school, the peculiar political circumstances under which 
the Kehr renaissance took place have tended to obscure an important 
aspect of his work which is also relevant to his interpretation of the Risk 
Theory. 
It is well-known that Kehr was strongly influenced by Max Weber's 
sociology. He also obviously admired Weber's political world view, his 
contemporary critique of Wilhelm I1's "personal rule" and, especially, of 
the dominant role of the junker aristocracy within the political and social 
system ofthe Kaiserreich. The "Kehrite" school has amplified both We-
ber's and Kehr's criticism of the "feudal" influence on German politics. 
More specifically, these historians have further developed Kehr's interpre-
tation of the symbiotic relationship between the "Sammlung" against 
socialism and the new departures in foreign policy. 
What has not received the same degree of attention, however, is the 
fact that Kehr also explicitly stated his agreement with some of Weber's 
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sillier political notions. For both, imperialism was a "tragic necessity" 
dictated by economic and political developments. lJ5 Only political quietists 
and pacifists believed that Germany could stand aside when every other 
Great Power was building an overseas empire. Realists knew that there 
was no alternative to participating in the coming struggle for markets and 
colonies; the burden had to be shouldered, even at the risk of war. Kehr 
obviously admired Weber's "statesman like" attitude towards the neet 
programme. 136 And, most importantly for our purposes, he shared Weber's 
belief that it was necessary to democratize the Wilhemine political system 
and break the junkers' hold on power so as to be able 10 pursue imperial-
ism more effeclive~)':lJ7 
Over thne it was impossible 10 pursue a capitalistically motivated 
foreign policy withoul providing this world policy with the necessary 
social base. 
In Kehr's interpretation, the half-hearted nature of the Risk Theory was 
due to the social and political constraints imposed by Sommllll1gspolilik. 
The political compromise between the bourgeoisie and the conservatives, 
underpinned by the trade-off between industrial and agrarian interests, 
served to keep the labour movement beyond the pale of political power. It 
dictated the need for a foreign policy of cheap successes that could be 
exploited in propaganda; but their pursuit must on no account carry the 
risk of real conflict. Tirpitz and his brother officers identified Britain as a 
potential opponent to serve their professional interest in building a large 
fieet. The Somm/lIng identified Britain as the main international rival of 
German industry. But the naval policy that resulted from this conjunction 
of interests was not carried out as ruthlessly as it could have been if it had 
had the whole nation behind it and not just the ruling classes. 
I have suggested above that the famous "palliative"-quote does not so 
much illustrate Tirpitz's understanding of the peculiar political situation of 
the Kaisel'l'eich as it does his reading of Mahan and his search for further 
arguments in favour of building a battlefieet. The tleet's functions as a 
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"pal itical power factor against England", as a "palliative" against Social 
Democracy, and an early version of the Risk Theory all appear at the same 
time, late DecembEer 1895. They can all be traced back to the ideology of 
sea power, and they all served Tirpitz's personal and professional interests 
at a turning-point in his career. 
Seen from this perspective, the inconsistency of the Risk Theory was 
not due to the constraints imposed by Sammhmgspolitik, but was rather 
the expression of Tirpitz's claim that sea power could exert a force in 
peacetime that was somehow independent of its military effectiveness in 
war. There is a parallel inconsistency in the attitude towards the fleet of 
Weber himself: at the time he was very much in favour of building the 
necessary power instrument, the more so as he was sure that the time was 
approaching when the Great Powers would have to fight for their respec-
tive shares of the world market. Yet after the war he Was heavily critical of 
the manner in which Tirpitz had alienated Britain and claimed that he 
himself had been in favour of pursuing Weltpolitik in accordance with 
Britain. 13B 
It would seem most correct to state that a naval programme based on 
the Risk Theory \Vas an attempt to reconcile the expansionist policy that 
Weber and his fellow liberal imperialists demanded, with an insoluble 
strategic problem. With the benefit of hindsight, Weber himself recognized 
the conundrum in January 1919: 139 
[Experience has taught U.I} thal for defensive purposes af/eellhe size 
of the French nOl:y would have slljjiced jor us. When Ihe geographical 
positions of Liverpool on the one hand, and Hamburg on the other, are 
taken into account, even a fleet equal to the British would not have 
been slrong enough 10 canT oul a real blockade of England. These 
were indeed major errors in Tilpit= 's attempt /0 can)! out a great power 
polic)' [Gernegro/3politikl, a policy which we opposed. 
Twenty years earlier Tirpitz's emphasis on the "political importance of sea 
power" had helped disguise that conundrum. Weber did not accept these 
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claims, but at the time he wholeheartedly supported the neet programme, 
despite its effect on Anglo-German relations. Furthermore, even if, as 
Weber and Kehr claimed, reform had created the necessary social base for 
a more assertive world and naval policy, surely the consequences would 
have been at least as catastrophic?'«' 
After the Second World War historians gained access to the German 
naval archives that had been captured by the Allies. The most thorough 
analysis of the strategic calculations upon which Tirpitz's naval policy was 
based, was carried out by Paul Kennedy in the late I 960s and early 
1970s.'4I Belter than anyone before or since, he was able to lay bare and 
document the glaring inconsistencies in Tirpitz's concepts. This is above 
all true ofKennedy's strategic critique of the role that the "risk neet" was 
supposed to play in peacetime. I-Ie sees Tirpitz as wanting to alter the 
power ratio with Britain and states that: "[ ... ] Tirpitz saw his batlleneet in 
the form of a sharp knife, held gleaming and ready only a few inches away 
from the jugular vein of Germany's most likely enemy."'42 
Kennedy goes on to ask precisely how this "dagger at the throat" 
strategy was supposed to function in peacetime. I-Iow could the political 
lever function? Was the fleet supposed to cruise closer to Britain in times 
of tension and thereby exert a form of diplomatic pressure? I-lis conclusion 
is simple: "[ ... ] the lever principle could not work in peacetime, either as a 
way to protect German interests in a colonial quarrel, or to pressure 
Britain, or to affect rapidly-changing developments on the other side of the 
globe."].)) 
Kennedy exposes the astounding "logic gaps" that culminate in the 
«basic paradoX» of the Risk Theory, and concludes that "The basic error 
was to believe that the British could be forced into concessions by the 
creation of this lever[ ... ]"'« I-lis exposure of Tirpitz's "silly" concepts is 
compounded by the fact, which Kennedy does not mention, that the Risk 
Theory was also incompatible with Tirpitz's own operational doctrines in 
Service Memorandum IX. 
All of this begs the question why Tirpitz pursued such a hollow policy, 
and how he got away with it. Kennedy proposes two motives, one being 
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the domestic political calculation propelling him forward, the second being 
that Tirpitz's final objective was probably to build a fleet larger than 
Britain's. This was, as has been mentioned earlier, the only means by 
which the fleet programme could be given a sense of strategic rationality. 
But it is precisely because the inconsistencies that Kennedy exposed are 
so glaring and incredible that it seems necessary to add a further explana-
tion. Since a strategic critique of the navy's alleged role in peacetime 
highlights its pitiful inadequacy, does it not seem more likely that its leaders 
actually believed their own claims about the "political importance of sea 
power"? We have seen that from Service Memorandum IX onwards 
Tirpitz advanced two alternative interpretations of sea power and that there 
is no logical connection between them. The difference between them can 
be illustrated thus: 
In a strategic analysis of the role of navies in war, sea power is a 
relative force, its strength depending on the ratio between the opposed 
fleets. Within the ideology of sea power the force exerted by navies in 
peacetime is understood in an absolute sense. The concept of the "political 
importance of sea power" implies that the mere possession of a navy 
represents a measure of sea power; it exerts a force in peacetime which 
seems to be more or less independent of the relative military strength of the 
same fleet in a war. Doubling your fleet doubles the "political importance" 
of your sea power in peacetime, whoever you may consider your most 
likely enemy in war. 
Kennedy's strategic critique of the role the "risk fleet" was supposed to 
play in peacetime exposes the futility ofTirpitz's claim tilat an altered 
power ratio with Britain could act as some kind of political lever. But if 
Tirpitz also did believe that each new battleship increased the fleet's 
"political importance" in peacetime, then he was acting somewhat more 
rationally (within the limits of the ideology of sea power). This would make 
it less likely that Tirpitz actually saw the fleet as a "dagger at the throat" of 
Britain. It would be more correct to say that he saw the I1 political impor-
tance" of a powerful fleet as a kind of reverse magnetic force that could 
prevent the iron gates from clanging shut in the tariff fortresses of Germa-
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ny's economic rivals. Or, to use a simile which would probably have been 
familiar to Tirpitz and which he might have heard from BUlow or the 
kaiser: 
Our situalion is like Ihal of Ihe Alhenions during the period when the)' 
had 10 build the long walls Iv Piraells without heing prl!lJenled fi-om 
finishing b)' Ihe lIIore poweljitl Spar/aIlS. N5 
As I have stated above, it is impossible to determine the extent to which 
Tirpitz actuaily believed in this interpretation of sea power, but he certainly 
had every incentive to do so. An ideology does not have to be logically 
consistent; and the ideology of sea power could serve the useful purpose 
of filling the logical gaps exposed in Kennedy's strategic analysis. This 
does not mean that the Tirpitz Plan was less offensive or more defensive 
than historians claim; it simply means that it is impossible to determine the 
exact mix of the various elements. 
It could well be that Tirpitz eventually aimed at building a larger neet 
than Britain's. But making him a rational actor from the mathematical point 
of view, by squaring the projected neet with Service Memorandum IX, 
only solves half the problem. One is still left with the fact that he ignored 
his own insight into Germany's abysmal geographical position in relation to 
the British Isles and into the likelihood of a wide blockade. Once again it 
would seem that the best way to compensate for the strategic diminution 
of relative sea power in war was to emphasize the enhancing "political 
importance» of sea power as an absolute factor in peacetime. 
Wegener's Strategic Alternative and the 
Contintuity of the German School 
Hitherto, I have interpreted the inconsistencies of the "risk fleet" against 
Britain as a result ofthe Mahanian ideology of sea power supplanting the 
operational doctrines within the German school. But a very different 
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explanation has been advanced. Since it is connected with a strategic 
alternative to the risk theory, it should also be considered in detail. 
Wolfgang Wegener's explanation was that pre-war German naval 
thought had been dominated by continental military thought 
("Iandmilitarisches Denken"), which had led it to develop a doctrine of the 
Ilbattle in itself", a battle devoid of strategic necessity or meaning. The Risk 
Theory, which Wegener rightly dismissed as "cant", was predicated on the 
notion that the British would seek out the German fleet to do battle in the 
Helgoland Bight. In fact, Wegener stated, such a battle would only occur 
when Germany threatened Britain's command of the sea; where there was 
no need to fight, it would not occur. Wegener quoted with approval the 
Schadenfj'eude ofa British officer writing in 1923:''1, 
The Brilishfleel did nol exislJor the purpose oJfighling Ihe German 
Fleel on a balllegrOlll1d and al a lime oJlhe laller's choosing Gnd 
purely Jor Ihe sake qffighting. 11 existedJor the purpose q{ obtaining 
and mainlaining command oJ the seas. And in so doillg it fit/filled its 
role. 
During the war, this concept of battle, as embodied in the Risk Theory, 
condemned the fleet to a strategically defensive, tactically offensive stance, 
the purely passive role of a "fleet in being". 
[n the light of the influence that Clausewitz had on German naval 
thought, especially through the medium of Stenzei, it is highly tempting to 
accept Wegener's explanation of the contradictions in Tirpitz's policy. But 
a closer examination of the solution he provided to Germany's strategic 
dilemma shows that we must search elsewhere for a more convincing 
explanation. Wegener defined command of the sea as "control of sea 
communications"; sea power he defined as the sum of fleet strength and 
geographical position relative to the great trade rOlltes - if one of these two 
factors is zero, it considerably reduces the effectiveness of the other. 
The vital trade routes upon which both Britain and Germany depended, 
all ran across the Atlantic and not through the North Sea. Wegener there-
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fore concluded that the decisive battle for command of the sea could only 
be forced on the British by breaking their wide blockade and threatening 
their control of communications in the Atlantic. A true strategic offensive 
should therefore have sought first to improve Germany's geographical 
position relative to the Atlantic by gaining bases on the French and Norwe-
gian coasts. 
Wegener recognized the fundamental geographical problem that Tirpitz 
had chosen to ignore after 1897. His definition of sea power as the sum of 
"fleet" and "position" led to the correct conclusion that the German navy 
could only carry out a true strategic offensive against Britain by first 
improving its position with regard to the great sea lanes. But his definition 
of command as the control of sea communications ignored the fact that in 
the final analysis, as Rosinski pointed out, command could only be exer-
cised by controlling the enemy. 
Tirpitz had recognized this fact in 1894, and from it he had drawn the 
conclusion that the strategic offensive must possess a numerical superior-
ity of one third to succeed. Wegener ignored the problem. He sought to 
find a solution to Germany's geographical weakness but overlooked the 
pressing matter of hall' the weaker fleet was supposed to gain a victory 
after it had challenged the Royal Navy to battleH7 In its own way, 
Wegener's solution to Germany's strategic problems in a war with Britain 
was just as incomplete as Tirpitz's. In addition, his strategic irrationality 
was compounded by an astonishing political blindness. How was it possi-
ble, after the experiences of 1917, to propose a method of defeating Britain 
which ignored the likelihood that the United States would intervene to save 
it?148 
The insufficiency of Wegener's solution to Germany's strategic conun-
drum suggests that his diagnosis of what caused Tirpitz's blindness -
continental military thought - might also be otf the mark. Indeed, we have 
seen that between 1891 and 1894 Tirpitz himself had honed the 
Clausewitzian dogmas of the earlier Prussian school on the realities of 
modern naval warfare to produce sharply defined operational doctrines. 
And we have subsequently seen that it was the new ideology of sea power 
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that lay behind the "cant" of the Risk Theory. Could it be that in this 
respect Wegener himself belonged to the German school he criticized so 
severely? 
A cursory reading of The Naval Strategy of the World War shows this 
to be the case. None of the post-war partisans of Wegener's critique of 
Tirpitz have mentioned that he himself shares the latter's ideology of sea 
power. He frankly advocates a brutal policy of overseas expansion and 
extols the value of the struggle for life.'" Wegener's theories in fact 
represent one of the most important bridges within the ideology of sea 
power between the imperialism of the Tirpitz generation of naval officers 
and the fascism of the one that followed.'so 
There is evidence to suggest that Wegener was more influenced by 
geopolitics than he was by strategic thought. He was a betler Mahanian 
than Tirpitz in his understanding oftbe importance oftbe Atlantic for 
Germany's sea power, but his expansionism has more of a fascist ring to it 
than that of the previous generation.'s! 
It is probably correct to see Stenzel as the originator of the Prussian 
school of naval thought. His abstract, Clausewitzian approach to the study 
of naval warfare was adapted by Tirpitz to meet the needs of the real navy 
in the early I 890s; this systematic work resulted in precise operational 
doctrines and a construction programme that was to provide Germany 
with the modem battlefleet it needed to defend itself in a war against 
France and Russia. At the same time Tirpitz introduced into the German 
school tbe ideology of sea power. By the end of the decade, his "political" 
interpretation of sea power had displaced the parallel "military" approach. 
The Risk Theory's emphasis on the decisive "battle in itself' in the 
Helgoland Bight was not a product of the line of thought that ran back to 
Stenzel and Clausewitz. It was a product of the ideolOgy of sea power 
derived Irom Mahan. 
The cant of the Risk Theory was an expression of the belief in sea 
power as a magical peacetime force. Wegener merely carried this cant to 
its absurd conclusion. He discarded the navalist notion that sea power 
could underpin Germany's rise to world power without war, in favour of 
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the fascist notion that world power would have to be wrested from the 
"Anglo-Saxons" by force. Seizing control of bases on the Atlantic coastline 
would certainly level out the disparity between the geographical positions 
of Germany and Britain - and perhaps force the latter to fight for com-
mand. But levelling-out is not enhancement; improving the "sea-strategic" 
position of the German fleet could not also compensate for its numerical 
inferiority. In the final analysis, Wegener was saying that his strategic 
offensive would somehow make the weaker fleet stronger than the 
stronger fleet - a proposition that owes more to metaphysics than it does to 
mathematics. 
Tirpitz, Maltzahn, Wegener and Assmann were leading influences on 
the development of the German school of naval thought for over a half a 
century. They all firmly believed in the ideology of sea power that first 
took shape in the Tirpitz Plan. Whether or not the Risk Theory really 
represented the strategic calculations on which the military foundations of 
Germany's political offensive rested, is less important than the fact that the 
alternatives proposed by Wegener and Assmannl52 were equally ineffective. 
They all founder on the rock of the doctrines of Service Memorandum IX. 
National Defence, Expansionism and Militarism 
The difference between the approach that culminated in those doctrines, on 
the one hand, and the ideology of sea power, on the other, is a perfect 
illustration of the distinction Alfred Vagts drew between the "military way" 
and the "militaristic way". 153 The first seeks to serve specific political 
objectives efficiently. "It is limited in scope, confined to one function, and 
scientilic in its essential qualities." Militarism is unlimited in its objectives 
and may even "hamper and defeat the purposes of the military way." With 
imperialism, "it shares the tendency to extend dominion." The former 
generally seeks size in the form of more territory, the lauer strength in the 
form of control over ever more men and more money. 
The operational doctrines of Service Memorandum IX precisely defined 
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the conditions under which the strategic offensive should be undertaken if 
it was to serve a meaningful military purpose. The objectives of the ideol-
ogy of sea power, on the other hand, were unlimited and undefinable. It 
provided a rationale for an imperialist foreign policy of expansion without 
object;'" and in domestic politics it served the militarism of a naval estab-
lishment that sought continuously to extend its control over men and 
resources. There are therefore strong grounds for suspecting that an 
institutional motive lay behind the enthusiastic adoption of the ideology of 
sea power 
If we give up the search for the ultimate rationality behind the Tirpitz 
Plan, it becomes easier to place German navalism within the context of 
High Imperialism. Irrational, pseudo-scientific theories were the hallmark 
of the age. As Hannah Arendt has pointed out, the nineteenth century was 
full of absurd philosophies which are completely forgotten today; if it had 
nol been for the scramble for Africa, the racial theories developed in 
France and Britain by Gobineau, Galton and others would have followed 
their authors onto the rubbish dump of history. Since imperialism could not 
be justified by - indeed completely contradicted and undermined - the 
theory of the nation state developed in Europe since the French Revolution, 
racialist theories came into their own to legitimize expansion and the 
subjugation of non-European peoples. 'ss 
Claude Raffestin has recently pointed out that the pseUdo-science of 
geopolitics, as inspired by Mahan and developed by Ratzel, served the same 
purpose of legitimizing expansion in the eras of imperialism and fascism. 
Maltzahn's admiration for Ratzel has already been referred to. An interest-
ing file among Tirpitz's papers contains his correspondence with Houston 
Stewart Chamberlain and his widow during the I 920s. There can be little 
doubt that his fervent admiration for the author of the racist and antisemitic 
Foundations of the Nineteenlh CentlllY (1899) dates back to before the 
war. If Tirpitz could find anything at all to admire in Chamberlain's rav-
ings, '" it makes his adherence to the ideology of sea power and his belief 
in the magical properties of navies seem the very height of lucidity. When 
that ideology took concrete form in the Tirpitz Plan, it provided the most 
64 OE'F(JOCE. STUDIES 21tl.l% 
important stepping-stone on Germany's road from Bismarck's saturated 
continental policy of balance and moderation to Nazism's unlimited "expan-
sion without object". 
One final word must be said on the narrower subject of the history of 
naval thought. Mahan, Tirpitz, Maltzahn, Castex, Wegener and Assmann 
were intelligent thinkers who made important contributions to the ~ludy of 
naval history and theory. At the same time, they all subscribed to expan-
sionist political ideologies which ranged from the pre-fascist to the luna-
tic.
'
" It is impossible to study the one and ignore the other because they 
continuously interacted. At this distance in time, historians should attempt, 
not to extract the "lasting insights" of such thinkers, but to study the 
interaction between the development of modern naval thought and the 
Zeitgeist. 
In the case of the German school, the ideology of sea power gave birth 
to the Risk Theory, the supposedly solid strategic underpinning for a more 
assertive German world policy. When its contradictions were laid bare 
after the outbreak of the First World War, other thinkers within the same 
school sought to cleanse their theories of the wishful thinking that had 
prevailed earlier. But since they, in turn, sought to pursue even more 
radical world political objectives, they were equally blind to the contradic-
tions in their own solutions to the same strategic problem. That blindness 
cannot be adequately explained without reference to the political ideology 
that drove them. 
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pp,27L 
7') As early as March 1894, Tirpitz wrote the following: "Is it really so hard to 
comprehend that Germany cannot allow its interests to be limited to Europe if 
Germany wishes to remain viable as the present developments continue. Do 
people really believe that it is possible to have a world industry without \vorld 
trade and world trade without world power? But world power is inconceivable 
without a strong navy." (Quoted in Deist: Flollenpolitik. p,35). Cf. Tirpitz: 
Erinnerllngen, p.SO. 
HO"Thc due use and control of the sea is but onc link in the chain of exchange by 
which wealth accumulates; but it is the central link, which lays under contribu-
tion other nations for the henel-it of the onc holding it, and which, history seems 
to assert, most surely of all gathers to itsclfriches." The b!(lllcJlce ojSea Power 
on HistOlJ! (London, 1965), pp.225L 
1I1I-listorians disagree about how influential Mahan was in Germany, but they do 
agree that he above all inJluenced the political world view ofthe navy and the 
nation. I am following Rosinski in emphasizing Mahan's influence on Tirpitz's 
strategic thought. According to Berghahn (Del' Ti/'lJit::-Plall. Genesis 1llld rCI/all 
eincr inllenpolitischen Krisel/strategie lin/er Wilhelm 1I (DOsseldort~ 1971), 
pp.145, I 79ff, 421), Mahan's influence on the German navy consisted of I} a 
social darwinist interpretation of the struggle for sea power; 2) an understanding 
of naval strategy similar 10 Tirpitz's; 3) a "philosophy of naval War", i.e. an 
interpretation of the inJluence of sea power on history which emphasized the 
rise and fall of great pmvers. Other historians have since written down Mahan's 
intluence in Germany, Baecker (Mahan liher Deutschland, p.14f.) points out 
that he was not only misunderstood, but that the kaiser, Tirpitz and others read 
what they wanted to find in his work and exploited this in their propaganda for 
the battleHect. Similarly: HCf\vig: The Influence 0/..1. T. Malum; and Michael 
Epkenhans: "Seemacht = Weltmacht. Alfred 1'. Mahan und sein Eintlu/3 aufdie 
Secstratcgie des 19. und 20. lahrhunderts" in Elvert/Jensen/Salewski (eds.): Kie/, 
die Deutsclwl1 lInd die See (Stuttgart, 1992). pp.35-47. Baeeker quotes Rosinski 
(Mahan and World War 1I, p.29) in support of this interpretation, but com-
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plelely misses the point of the argument he truncates. Rosinski did point out 
that "a wildly exaggerated picture of his [Mahan's] inlluence on German public 
opinion" had been created. But in the S<lffiC paragraph he is at pains to emphasize 
that "The profound influence of Mahan upon the development of German naval 
policy ( ... J is aUributable rather to the fact that the peculiarity of Germany's 
position within the circle ofihe major sea powers made her, or rather made the 
leading spirit in German naval policy, Tirpitz, particularly sllsceptible to the 
fallacies in Mahan '5 arguments." It is a great pity that the onl.Y German writer to 
have noticed Rosinski should have misapprehended him to such a degree, 
82As in the case ofClausewitz's influence on Tirpitz's thought, the closest one 
can get to direct evidence ofMahan's importance for his development is the 
memoir written by his son in 1918 (BA-MA N 25311 14); [My father] ''\vas vcry 
interested in English history, Mahan's Influence of Seapower upon History left 
a permanent imprint [nachhaftigen Ei/!/lussJ on his thought" 
H]Berghahn/Deisl: Rfislllng, pp.89f.. 
H~C( the lettcr la Stosch of 21 Dec. 1895, Ibid, pp. 1 03 f.. The best illustration of 
how he juxtaposed these two interpretations is the draJl speech of March 1896 
(Hallmann: Kriigerdepsche, pp.79-87) which contains the essence of his military 
and political thought Wilhehn, too, wa..<; directly influenced by his reading of 
Mahan when, in a speech given at the Kriegsakademie on 8 Feb. 1895, he 
pointed out "that the extent ora nation's maritime commerce ought to be the 
measuring-stick for the size of her navy." (Lambi: Navy, p.34). Theodore Ropp 
appositely commented on this notion: "The idea that a navy should be propor-
tionate to the maritime interests of a country was a relic of the days when it was 
necessary to police the seas against the Barbary pirates or force civilization on 
the Chinese. As a doctrine for national defense against another first-rate Euro-
pean power, it was as irrational as the notion that an air force should be propor-
tional to the "air intercsts" created by a LuJ1hansa or a Pan American." French 
Naval PoliCY, p.335. But it should be added that it was Mahan who created the 
conditions for this strange concept to be regarded as the very height of strategic 
wisdom. 
"~Berghahn/Deist: RIlstllng, pp.l 14-17. 
M('That Tirpitz was well aware of this, is testiJied to by his notes for an interview 
with Wilhelrn on 15 June 1897. Hallmann: Del' If'eg, pp.240( (Sce below for 
further comment). 
87 An interesting illustration of how Tirpitz used both arguments is quoted by 
Jonathan Steinberg in Yesterday's Deterrent, TiJpit= and the Birth o/the German 
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Battle Fleet (London, 1965), p.193f. Replying to liberal criticism, Tirpitz told the 
Reichstag on 23 March 1898: "If the batlle neet is to prevent an acute illness in 
case of \\'ar, [hat is death by strangulation for Germany, it must equally prevent 
a chronic feebleness of our economic life in peacetime." 
HSEckart Kehr was the first to point out that Tirpitz identilied Britain as a new 
potential enemy before the Transvaal crisis soured relations between the two 
countries, Scldaclztjlottenball, p.38 I, note 5. In Kchr's view, Tirpilz and the 
ollicer corps were driven almost exclusively by institutional and professional 
motives, ibid, pp.6f.note 13, 349[, 380[ He saw them as searching for an enemy 
to justify a big fleet and believed that Tirpitz also invented the claims of the 
ideology of sea power for the same renson. Kehr poured scorn on the notion put 
forward by naval propagandists that fleet construction was a "productive" 
investment, that naval strength underpinned economic growth in peacetime, and 
that history demonstrated that powers which lost their naval preeminence also 
declined economically - in short on the central claims ofthc ideology of sea 
power. pp.38, 45f., 102. But he did not recognize the extcnt to which Tirpitz 
drcw on Mahan for these ideas (he only mentions Mahan in passing, e.g. pAS). 
In reccnt historiography, the notion that Tirpitz was abovc all a bureaucratic 
empire builder driven by Ressorteifer, is 10 be found in the work of Patrick J 
Kelly, 71le Naval Policy o/Imperial Germany, J 900~ J 9 J -I (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Georgctown University, 1970), & Ti/pie as Bllreallcrat- Politician (unpublished 
paper, 1976); also, drawing on KeUy, Ga1)1 Wcir: Building the Kaiser's Navy 
(Annapolis, 1992), 
8\1Tirpitz's comments of 3 lan. 1896 on the programme oflhe High Command, in 
Berghahn/Deisl: Rlts/lIng, p.197. 
'11110nathan Steinberg is right to point Ollt that thc Risk Theory did not represent 
anything new, but it can be followed even further back than to 1897. (Yester-
day's Deterrent, p.20 I), ct". HaIlmann: Kriigerdepesc/ze, pp.83fT. 
91Tirpitz was in Kiel, waiting for thc order to comc through for him to take up 
thc command of the East Asian squadron, when he was drawn to the attention of 
the kaiser. On 17 December, Wilhelm asked him to comment on the High 
Command's programme of28 November. (Hallmann: De,. /Veg, p.169f.) The 
letter to Stosch was therefore written at the same time as Tirpitz was honing the 
argumcllls that were to convince Wilhelm. 
'J'Tirpilz to Stosch, 21 Dec. 1895, in Berghahn/Deisl: RaS/llng, p.l 03. 
')]This is not the only source to show that Tirpitz believed that the gro\\1h of the 
socialist movement sapped (he strength of the nation, cf. Hallmann: Del' 1Veg. 
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p.134f.; letter to Prince J-Jeinrich of28 Jan.1907, in Berghahn/Deist: Rlistullg. 
p.323. It is at this point that the story of the navy's development touches upon 
some of the most controversial topics in the historiography ofWilhelminc 
Germany. It was Eckart Kehr \vho !irst linked contemporaf)' developments in 
domestic politics \vith the construction of the fleet against Britain. Several 
leading historians have sinced followed him in this, whereas GeolTEley has 
attempted to untie the knot ("SalJllllbmgspolitik, Social Imperialism and the 
Navy Law of 1898" in Eley: From Uni/icatioll to Na=ism. Reill!elpretillg the 
German Past (Boston, 1986), pp.!1 0-53). A discussion of these matters lies 
outside the scope of the present article. 
"'Mahzahn (0 Tirpitz of 28 Aug. 1895. BA-MA N 253/408. 
~5Wol1gang J. Mommsen: Max Weber llncl die delllsche Po/itik 1890-1920 (2nd 
ed., TObingen, 1974), p.82. 
')('it was republished in the collection The Interest o/America ill Sea Power, 
Present alld Future (London, 1898), pp.1 07-36. The following quote is from 
p.122, According to Hattendorf(eds.): A Bibliography o/The Works o/A1j;·ecl 
Thayer Afahan (Newport, R.I., 1986), a German translation did not appear until 
the collection itself was translated as Die weijJe Rasse 11lld die Seeherrschq(t 
(Leipzig, 1909). 
'
J7ln the memorandum of 3 Jan. 1896 (Berghahn/Deist: Riistllllg, p.196) the 
argument is repeated in a slightly different form \\'hich mixes a quote from 
J'vla([zahn's letter with lhe same (probable) quote from the rvlahan article. 
Tirpitz now speaks of lithe best means against eCllcated and uneducated Social 
Democracy" (although according to Berghahn: Tirpit=~Plall, p. J 46, note 132, the 
first drafts still speak of a "strong palliative"). I-le adds that through the prol110~ 
tion of its sea interests Germany will also be able to utilize the surplus wealth of 
its "human production". which at present tlpartly threatens to choke us, is partly 
either lost through emigration or serves to strengthen our competitors." 
'lHLambi: Nm~v, p.165; Herwig: "The Failure of German Sea Power. 1914-1945: 
Mahan, Tirpitz, and Raeder Reconsidered", in International His!OI), Review, X 
(1988), pp.68-1 05; here p.78. 
'!'JConclusive proof of Maltzahn 's rVlahanian ideology of sea power can be found 
in his first article on the subject, "Secherrschafl", in Nelle miliWrische Bliitter, 
June 1895. The following is based on his letter ID Tirpitz 01'28 Aug. 1895, BA-
MA N 253/408. 
lIfl.lUnlorlunately, Maltzahn did not describe in detail the workings of this 
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magical force that would secure access to markets more effectively than the 
production of quality products at competitive prices would. 
!!lIOn radical nationalism, sce Gearl' Eley: Reshaping the Germall Right. Radical 
Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck (Ann Arbor, 1991) and Roger 
Chickering: We Men Who Feel Most German. A Cultural Stlldy o/the Pall~ 
German League, J 886~J 9 J.J (Boston, 1984). For the effects of radical national_ 
ism on the arm)'. sce Stig Forstcr; Der doppelte Militarismlls. Die delltseile 
HeeresriisllIl1gspolitik :::11'ischell stallls~qllo·Sicherlll1g lllld Aggression J 89(}~ 
J 9 J 3 (Stullgart, 1985). 
l!l2According to Michaelis. who attended his lectures from the autumn of 1900, 
BA·MA N 164/4, (p.7 forthe following quote). His discussion of the uses to 
which Clausewitz \vould be put in naval theory can be found in "Was lehrt das 
Buch des Generals von Clausewitz lIVom Kriege" dem Seeonizier?", in Alarine 
Rlllldschou (1905), pp.683·702. Maltzahn's interpretation fits exactly \vhat has 
already been said about StenzcJ and needs no further cumment here. 
InJer Del' Kampfgegell die Seeherr.l'chaji, a lecture MalLzahn gave in 1898. BA-
MA, RM 811120. 
W'Sec the next section for the incompatibility of the Risk Theory with Service 
Memorandum IX. 
IIIl-According to Ratzel the state \vas an organism linked to the soil and bound. 
like any organism, to grow in a "struggle for space" with its international 
competitors. He invented the term LebelIsrallm to describe this space. Drawing 
on Haeckel and Spencer, he sought to show that human societies were subject to 
the same bioiogicallaws as the rest of the natural world. His most important 
study for navalists was Das Meer ats Qllelle del' F6lkergrdjJe. Eine pOlifisch~ 
geographische Sllldie (Munich. 1900). He published two long articles on Die 
nordatlantisc/len Mdchle in the Marine RllIu}schall in 1903. Maltzahn 's eulogis-
tic obituary, Friedrich Rat=el. Eill Gedellkll'ort, also appeared there in 1905. On 
the strong links between Mahan's and Ratzd's imperialism and Kjcllcn's and 
Hauhofer's geopolitics, see Raffestin: Geopolitiqlle et hisloil'e, pp.29-117, and 
passim. 
lII('The term derives from Volker Berghahn's fundamental study: Der Tilpit=~ 
Plan. It describes a peculiar mixture of defensive military and offensive pOlitical 
strategies. Put simply. by constructing a battle fleet in the North Sea at least 
tWlHhirds the size of the opposing Royal Navy, Britain was to be deterred from 
attacking Germany. This so~called "risk fleet" would not itselrbe strong enough 
to attack Britain. On the other hand, the Roya~ Navy would not dare to risk a 
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battle for fear of losing so many ships that it would lose its command of the sea 
to other sea powers. On the foundations of this military deterrent, Germany 
would be able to pursue its \\'orld-political ambitions. These included access to 
overseas markets and supplies of raw materials, more ovcrsea<; colonies, perhaps 
even the redistribution ofthc globe between the three or four world powers of 
the twentieth century. According to Berghahn, the plan also had a strong 
domestic clement. The feudal political and military elite of Germany useu world 
policy in general and the fleet construction plan in particular to manipulate 
public opinnn. It was to serve as the rallying-point for an alliance between the 
bourgeois, conservative and Catholic parties to prevent the labour movement 
from democratizing German society. Tirpitz aimed through the Navy Law to 
establish an "iron budget" which would shield the navy from the interference of 
the Rcichstag and effectively prevent the parliamentarization of the Kaiserreich. 
In Berghahn's interpretation, the fleet was therefore built against both parliament 
and England and would above all serve to preserve the anachronistic political and 
social structures of the Bismarckian Reich well into the twentieth century. 
1II7See Lambi: Nm:v, pp.33f., 155, 159 and Kehr: Schlach~jlollellball. pp.177f., 
310, 315f., for a collection ofWilheIm's characteristically contradictory \vishes. 
lIIHlr only Friedrich I-iollmann, the State Secretary of the newly constituted 
Reichsmarineamt (the Imperial Navy Ot1ice) from 1888 to 1897, had been able 
to deliver his mixed bag of overseas cruisers and ,1 motley collection of ball le-
ships, Wilhelm would not have replaced him with Tirpitz and his far more 
ambitious plan for a navy against England. Hans Hallmann: Der 1Veg, pp. Xl, 56, 
96, 188(, 210, 238, 339. The differences between Hollmann 's last construction 
proposals and Tirpitz's first Navy Law six months later were not very signifi-
cant; it was the systematic form of Tirpitz's proposals that so impressed {he 
Reichstag, cf. Kehr: Schlachtflottenball, pp. J 21, 125[ John e.G. Rtlhl ("Oer 
Konigsmechanismu5 im Kaiserreich", in idem: Kaiser, Ho/ulldStaal. Wilhelm 11 
und die delltsche Fo/iNt, (Munich 1987), p.129) gives Wilhelm too active a role 
in thejormlllatioll of naval policy. Wolf gang Mommsen ("Kaiser Wilhelm Il and 
German Politics", in Journal o/Contemporary History, 25 (1990), pp.289-316~ 
here p.296f.) points out thal "perhaps the most important source ofWilhelm's 
imperial power [ ... ] was the area of personal appointment to high office." His 
personal choices could have enormous political consequences. In his 
appointement of Tirpitz, at least, he does not seem to have rCl.llized what they 
would be. 
w9Jonathan Steinbcrg: Yesterday's Deterrent, p.25. 
[WMommsen: Kaiser Wilhelm 11, p.301f.; Lambi: Navy, p.158f. 
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III It might seem that such a conjuncture was so peculiar as to have been only 
possible in Germany; the Tirpitz Plan would seem the outcome of that coun-
try's SOlldenl1eg, or singular path of historical development. In fact, there is 
another contemporary example of a similar conjuncture: Russia after 1907. There 
also, the combination of the personal rule ora Tsar with an inclination towards 
the navy. expansionist bourgeois parties in the Duma and a construction plan 
based on the ideology of sea power skcwed arms spending in favour of the navy. 
See the fascinating account of the motives (especially Izvo!'skij's) behind the 
"Big" naval construction programme of J 909 and its accellaration in J 9 J 2, in 
K.F. Shatsillo: Russkij imperiali::m i ra::vitie flata nakanune pervoj mirovoj 
vOjllY, 1906-191 4gg. (Moscow, 1968), pp.44-90. On the effects of the ensuing 
"disproportionate" spending on the navy, see idem: "0 disproportsii v razvitii 
vooryzhcnikh si! Rossij nakanunc pcrvoj mirovoj vojny", in lstoricheskie =apiski 
83 (1969), pp.123-36. 
I12BcrghahnlDcist: Riistung, p.134-36. 
113Bcrghahn: Der Tilpit:-PlaJ1, pp. J 02-7. 
114Jbid. p.103. 
115BerghahnIDeist: Riistung. p.135. (My emphasis). 
""Ibid, pp.122-27. (My emphasis). 
11 7Hallmann: Der Weg, p.240f.; Lambi: Navy, p.143, for the following. 
IIIIRatzel: Das Meer als QueUe (1910 cd.), pp.24, 33; Mahan: "Considerations 
Governing the Disposition of Navies". in Mahan all Naval Strategy, pp.281 ~319: 
Gemzell: OrgalJi=ation, p.79f. 
119Dralt of preamble, Novcmber 1897. in Berghahn/Deist: R{istllng, pp. 147-54; 
here p.153. 
l~uTirpitz: EriJltlerllngell, p.1 05(; the following quotc from Lambi: Nm~l', p.14 7. 
See also Paul M. Kennedy: "Tirpitz, England, and the Second Navy Law of 
1900: A Strategical Cri[ique", in MiJitiirgeschichtliche MitteUungen, 2 (1970), 
p.35ff.. for other references. 
III Sce Berghahn: Del' Tirpitz-Plan, passim, for the dcfinitive treatment of this 
subject. 
I21Dalmhardts memorandum 01'2 Nov.1903, in Berghahn/Deist: Riis/lIng, 
pp.171-79. 
l2JTirpitz explicitly stated this objective in a lettcr to Prince Heinrich 01'28 
Jan.1907,lbid, p.323. 
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1~.4Tirpitz to Reich Chancellor Bulow, Ibid, pp.180-86. 
12~Cf. Tirpitz's notes for an interview with Wilhelm on 26 Sept.l911, Ibid, 
p.335. 
12GBerghahn: Der Tirpitz-Plan, p.194. See also Herwig: The Fallllre a/German 
Sea Power, p.?? and his Introduction lo Wolfgang Wegcner: Hie Naval Strategy 
of the World War, cd. Herwig (Annapolis, Md., 1989), p.xvii. 
l27The fundamental reason for this is a consequence of the theoretically indivis-
ible nature of command: there is no difference between offensive and defensive 
warfare at sea. Tirpitz had himself recognized this in 1894. 
WIn a letter to the Chief of the Admiralty Staff of 16 Sept. 1914, Tirpitz was 
desperately casting around for arguments in favour of a fleet offensive and even 
went so far as to claim that: "Almost always, throughout world history, weaker 
fleets have beaten stronger ones." Erillllerllngen, p.312. 
Il~Assmann: Gedanken, Il, p.320. These three articles by the head of the 
Historical Section of the navy contain a crushing indictment ofTirpitz's naval 
policy. Assmann is the only historian to have pointed out the incompatibility of 
Service Memorandum IX with the Risk Theory (Gedanken, I, pp. 190f.). Cf. 
Rosinski: Strategy and Propaganda, pp.8Sf.. 
lJ(JWhicn is the conclusion drawn by Paul Kennedy Tirpitz, England, pp.55-7 
and Slrategic Aspects, pp.158-60. 
131I-lallmann: Der Weg, p.262. 
132Intcrview of 28 SepL 1899, Bcrghahn/Deisl: Riistllflg, pp. I 59-62. 
mSchlachtflottenbau, p.31? (Kchr's emphasis). Il is interesting to notc. in light 
of the work of the later "Kchrite" school, that Kchr himself does not use it as 
evidence of Tirpitz's grand manipulative design. In Kehr's view, Tirpitz was 
above all an omcer who sought to advance the interests of his service, but who 
was also attuned to social and political rcalilies. The "palliative"-quotc is 
therefore evidence that the «risk fleet» was the strategic expression of the 
"Sammlung" and not the centre around which it crystallized. 
!)~Thc term "Kehritc" was coined for (his tendency by Wolf gang Mommsen in 
"Innenpolitische Bestimmungsfaktoren der deutschcI1 Aul3enpolitik vor 1914", in 
idem: Der autoritiile Nationalslaat. Velfassllllg. Gesellschaft IIlld Kultur im 
deu/schell Kaiserreich, (Frankfurt, 1990), p.321 f. The ensuing debate does not 
concern us herc. For a survey, see Rolf Hobson: "Slutten pa den lyskc 
SOlldenl leg? Keiserrikcts historiografi og Forbundsrepublikken gar nye vcicr", 
His/orisk tidssknji 311989. 
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I)~e.g. Kehr: Schlachtjlottenbau, pp.7, 325f., 348. For Weber, see Mommscn: 
Mw: rVeber, passim. 
')('Schlachtjlottenball, p.403ff. 
"'Ibid, r.431 and ff. 
IJHWolfgang Mommsen points out the "Inkonsequenz" between Weber's 
attitudes towards England and towards the tleet in Max Weber, p.150. 
'3~Max Weber: lur Nellordmmg Dellrschlands (TObingen, 1991), p.65. 
14°Momrnsen: MaxWeber, p.167. 
'~'Kenncdy: Tilpit=, England & Strategic Aspects. 
'42Tirpil:, England, p.38. 
'4Jfbid. pA4. 
'Hfbid. p.SO. 
'45Quotcd in Berghahn: Der Tirpit=-PlaJl, p.390, BOlow to WilhcJm in Dec.1904. 
The latter answered: "My dear BOlow, how often I have used this very compari-
son myself ill recent years!" In his Erinnerungen, p.51, Tirpitz writes that "The 
'open door' that could all too easily be closed, was as important for us as their 
endless open spaces and inexhaustible natural resources were to the other world 
powers. " 
w'Rrevel Lieutenant-Colonel R.B. Beadon: "The Sea Power of Germany and the 
Teaching ofMahan", inJRUS/48 (1923), p.507; Wegener: The Naval Strategy of 
the World War, p.IOO. 
147Rosinski: Strategy and Propaganda, pp.84-7. 
'4gEven Tirpilz recognized that the Anglo-Saxon "blood-bond" would never 
acquiesce in the defeat of England, only in Germany's overtaking it peacefully, 
Eri1merungen, p.162. 
Wle.g. The Naval Strategy of the 1Yorld War, pp. 120-27. 
'5JlAdolf von Trotha, one ofTirpitz's closest collaborators and firsl biographers, 
went the whole hog and joined the Nazi party, as did Lcvetzow (Gemzell: 
Organization, pp.3J 0, 317). Together with Michaelis, Wegener and several 
others, he demanded the revision of the Versailles Treaty as the first step on the 
road to a renewed struggle for world power with the Anglo-Saxons. On this 
topic, see the important articles and documents published by Gerhard Schreibcr: 
(I) "Thesen wr ideologischen Konlinuitat in den machtpolitischen Zielselzungen 
der dcutschen Marineflihrung 1897 bis 1945", in M. Mcsserschmidt et aL (eds); 
Militargeschichte. Probleme - TlIesen - rVege (Stuttgart, 1982), pp.260-80; (2) 
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"Zur KontinuiUit des GroBM und Weltmachtstrebens der deutschen 
Marinettihrung", in Militargeschichtliche Aiitleilllngen 2 (1979), pp. I 01-71. 
Wegener is discussed in (I) p.263, and (2) pp.119f. The link between Wcgener's 
ideas and geopolitics is apparent in Gadow: tlDie secstrategischen Lcitgedanken 
der schwachen Seemachtc", in Marine Rllndschau, Aug.MSepL 1926. 
1~IPerhaps it would be an idea to classify Wegener as a "maritime fascist" until 
such time as historians arc given free access to his papers to prove otherwise? 
Gemzell (Organization, p.74) points out that Ratzel drew attention to the 
dangers of a wide blockade in Das Meer als QueUe der Volkergrdj3e and that he 
also proposed acquiring territory bordering on the Atlantic. Herwig notes that 
Haushofer was greatly impressed by Wegcncr's book. Introduction, p.xxxvii. 
1.1 2Assmann outlincd his ideas on U-boat warfare in "Wandlungen der 
ScekriegfUhrung", in Nallliells (1943), pp.123M62; er. Rosinski's comments in 
Strategy and Propaganda, pp.87 M 91. 
1~3Vagts: A History of MilitarL\'nl. Civilian and MilitalJ' (New York, 1959) 
pp. I 3ff .. 
1~~Following all his important discovery of the Royal Navy's plans for a hunger 
blockade of Germany, Avner Offer has sought to justify the Tirpitz Plan as a 
rational and legitimate measure of national defence against the British threat. Ct'. 
The First World War.' An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford, 1989), pp.325L I do 
not share this view; but for reasons ufspace I mUSl defer discussion of this 
subject to a more extensive study currently in preparation. 
1~~Hannah Arendt: Elemente 11l1d Urspriinge totaler Herrschafl (Munich, 1979), 
p.306. 
1~&Though it must be added in fairness that there is very little evidence that 
Tirpitz himself was an active anti-semite. 
157Readers who find that too strong an adjective, are advised to consider Castex's 
interpretation of history as the perpetual struggle between Europe and the Asian 
barbarians, Cf. Raoul Castcx: Strategic 71wories, cd.EugeniaC. Kiesling 
(Annapolis. Md., 1994), p.XXXY. 
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